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Question: Do you know if [the decedent] gave [his daughters] a copy 
of the new will? 
Answer: I don’t believe he did, no. 
Question: Do you know why? 
Answer: Well, I guess because we didn’t have the completed draft 
without all the scribbles on it. 
Question: So he thought that will was not good yet? 
Answer: No, he was sure it was good, but he didn’t give it to the 
girls.  And we didn’t give it to my son.  We didn’t give it to anybody. 
Question: Why? 
Answer: Because it wasn’t completely finished the way [the attorney] 
was going to finish it.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within wills law, a demand for precise compliance with statutory 
requirements has been waning for quite some time.  This is nothing new.2  
Considered support for this admitted “fall of formalism” must inhere in 
the strength and understanding of any doctrine that rises to replace it.  
But so far, jurisprudential treatment of that replacement—testamentary 
intent—falls short of the mark. 
                                                     
*  Orpha & Maurice Merrill Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  
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 1. In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002).  Under a statute requiring attested 
wills to be in writing and signed by the testator and two witnesses, an attempted joint will signed by 
both of its putative testators and notarized but not otherwise witnessed was accepted into probate as 
clearly and convincingly reflecting that the decedent intended it to be his will.  Id. at 1135–36. 
 2. Twenty years ago, the Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code stated that a decades-
long theme in probate law was “the decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving policies.”  UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE art. II prefatory note (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 75 (1998). 
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Testamentary intent is a piece of tricky business, with the potency 
both to secure probate of highly irregular documents where it exists and 
impede admission of closely conforming documents where it fails.  As 
such, its significance can exceed formalistic rules of law by overriding 
compliance and noncompliance with the statutory requirements imposed 
by a given jurisdiction for the execution of a valid will.3  Coupling that 
constitutive force with its second-level role in will composition, 
construction, and revocation highlights the expanse of its power and, 
tautologically, the importance of identifying it in existence and extent. 
That said, confluent factors can make testamentary intent an 
extraordinarily elusive concept.  Although assorted indicators guide 
presumption and assessment over whether any basic “intent” exists 
within a particular context, both the term and the thoughts it describes 
are inalterably subjective.  Intent may be held without any action to 
further it.  Conversely, action may be driven by an entirely different 
purpose than presumed as its cause, or even occur more or less 
mindlessly without identifiable purpose at all.4  Given its own 
definitional permutations, adding the modifier “testamentary” does little 
to clarify things.  Indeed, the imprecision that attends both words—
“testamentary” and “intent”—is compounded by their joinder: a will’s 
proponent must establish that its writer wrote it with present, immediate, 
conditional, revocable, future, deathtime, donative, non-will substitutive, 
and dispositive significance5—an already oddly paradoxical mental turn 
twisted even more by context.  Unless the proffered document is a 
suicide note, its writer usually has no thoughts of its immediate 
consequence, and once the search for testamentary intent is on, death has 
already sealed her lips. 
Doctrinally, some degree of inter- and even intra-jurisdictional 
disarray is ineluctable as the existence of testamentary intent turns on 
intensely subjective factors.  Moreover, whether consciously or not, 
judges or juries seeking testamentary intent infuse personal perspectives 
into what should be an objective search for that subjective factor.  
                                                     
 3. With rare exception, the relevant scholarship generally focuses on intent as adjunct to the 
means–ends interplay between invalid will execution and statutory compliance.  See infra note 42 
and accompanying text.  Little discussion targets testamentary intent in its own right. 
 4. Simplistically, one might eat a carrot because of hunger, a desire to eat the vegetable before 
it goes bad, an understanding that doing so is good for one’s eyes, a commitment to setting a good 
example for children, or a belief in the Easter Bunny.  Or, one might eat a carrot simply because it is 
there. 
 5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. a 
(1999). 
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Unfortunately, this doubled subjectivity often generates sharply different 
outcomes in cases with no appreciable difference in their underlying 
intent-reflective facets save trifling distinctions in the will’s documentary 
language6 or the size or recipient of the estate.7 
To say that that consequence is inevitable, however, misses the 
matter of degree and in no way absolves courts of the duty to halt or at 
least mitigate harm.  Unpredictable outcomes encourage inefficient 
litigation and impose unnecessary economic and human costs on parties 
to it.  But matters worsen when ideational difficulty and jurisdictional 
difference devolve into jurisprudential incoherence, which is a by-
product of concepts haphazardly defined and applied.  Resultant 
unfairness is indeed an avoidable consequence that neither case law nor 
commentary has done much to rectify.  While the possibility that 
testamentary intent will be frustrated by failure to comply with wills’ 
formalities is well-developed, its frustration by failure to conform to its 
own hyper-restrictive definition is not.  “There are many possible 
components to testamentary intent . . . .”8  While “a more coherent body 
of law [might emerge] if we had more precise terminology for [its] 
different strands,”9 “no one has yet sorted [them] out.”10   
This Article attempts that end.  Part II reviews uncontroversial extant 
doctrine: testamentary intent is central to a document’s admission to 
probate and its construction thereafter.  Part III reveals that the law of 
wills has strayed from this sine qua non by frequently failing to 
understand and locate testamentary intent in thoughtful, predictable 
ways.  Part IV continues by seeking the root of that failure and concludes 
that the most likely but subtle culprit is the peculiar property–non-
                                                     
 6. Compare Estate of Blake v. Benza, 587 P.2d 271, 273–74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (admitting 
into probate as a holographic will a letter that admonished the recipient to “SAVE THIS”), with In re 
Golder’s Estate, 193 P.2d 465, 466–67 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (denying probate of a letter reading 
“should I get in this war and not come back I want my savings & stock to go to you” (emphasis 
omitted)), and McBride v. McBride, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 476, 486–89 (1875) (denying probate of a 
purported will and letter, both of which the author requests the recipient to burn). 
 7. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: 
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 4.1 (3d ed. 2004) (“American courts do not (at 
least expressly) consider who the devisees are in passing upon the formal validity of wills.”).  The 
parenthetical admission is telling.  See also Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (1996) (asserting that courts often employ ostensibly intent-
effectuating doctrine actually to thwart intent and favor family members). See generally sources 
cited infra note 230. 
 8. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 250 (7th ed. 2005). 
 9. James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1992) [hereinafter 
Lindgren, Formalism]. 
 10. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 250. 
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property nature of the testamentary beast itself.  Intent loses both 
deliberateness and expressive clarity where action upon it, such as 
writing a will, holds little immediate consequence for either a particular 
testator or the beneficiaries she hopes to enrich.11 
The history of relevant litigation displays that clumsy intent doctrine 
is nothing new and might have worked “well enough” when a failure to 
comply with the stated rules essentially foreclosed further discussion of 
its presence.  But more precise tools construct more precise things and 
usually at a lower eventual cost.  More importantly, they permit users to 
bring design to fruition and intent to purpose far more reliably than 
cumbersome instruments allow.  A deepened understanding of 
testamentary intent has always been worth the effort.  Still, it is more 
critical now than ever given the enhanced role that intent plays in 
reducing a will’s formalities and tempering or even excusing 
documentary defects.  Further, new technologies, expanded definitions of 
writings and signatures,12 broader entryways for extrinsic evidence, and 
ever-proliferating will substitutes13 will alter the methods of its 
expression in ways that may well require enhanced understanding of the 
term.  Refining testamentary intent as defined and applied facilitates Part 
V’s attempt to reorder its structure and use.  Testamentary intent should 
be non-formalistic, rejecting the convention that its holder intends a 
precise match between it and the particular document at hand.  
Moreover, it should be more easily found, with forgiving evidentiary 
hurdles over both the standard of proof demanded for its determination 
and the sources from which it may be drawn. 
                                                     
 11. Introductory discussion during the fall 2010 semester of my Wills & Trusts class vividly 
made this point.  I asked students to explain the relatively low incidence of testate death, even 
among lawyers.  To paraphrase one student’s response, “It is because writing a will does not really 
seem to make an immediate difference to anyone.  I will retain the same rights to the property after I 
have made a will as I had possessed before—nothing lost.  The same holds true for the people I write 
into my will—nothing gained.” 
 12. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act permits electronic records 
and signatures in certain contexts, but specifically excludes wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts.  
15 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 7003(a)(1) (2006).  Nevada is the only state to have passed an electronic wills 
statute.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.085 (West Supp. 2011).  See generally Joseph Karl Grant, 
Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 105 (2008) (discussing the bases for the writing requirement and advocating 
recognition of electronic wills). 
 13. For example, although a trust generally requires a res and a will amendment generally 
requires reexecution, modern statutes permit a valid will to pour a mere expectancy interest into an 
otherwise-unfunded trust, then functionally amend that will each subsequent day without meeting 
reexecution or other wills law requirements, simply by amending the trust.  Testamentary intent for 
the will is key to the plan’s success.  UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT § 1 
(amended 1991), 8B U.L.A. 360 (1998). 
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Attempting fuller understanding of testamentary intent is free and 
easy, but restructuring content-based, procedural, and evidentiary rules is 
not.  More flexible intent standards might be feared as precision 
antithesis, engaging courts in otherwise procedurally avoidable litigation 
and rendering mistake-laden outcomes in finding a will where none was 
intended.  But rigid, arguably unfair standards create similar 
vulnerability to mistake, but with outcomes flowing in the other 
direction.  Where perfection is unattainable, this “hard place” “between 
over- or under-inclusion errors” is familiar yet frighteningly irreversible.  
That said, selecting rules that risk over-inclusion by favoring the 
identification of testamentary intent—and therefore wills—is the better 
choice: no one will die for courts having done so.  Testamentary-enough 
intent more than likely exists anyway, and to some extent, responsibility 
for any marginal misstep in finding it would rest appropriately with the 
decedent who had left evidence to that effect in the first place. 
Efficiency arguments aside, discerning and classifying a particular 
decedent’s intent in writing a particular document improves appropriate 
regard and immediate results for that decedent, her estate, and those she 
holds dear.  Doing right by individual citizens is a decent end in itself.  
But revitalized intent doctrine also respects property rules and the 
simultaneously individualistic and collective freedoms they hold close.  
Such values deserve mindfulness wherever they arise, and the many 
crossroads captured by testamentary intent make it a valuable vehicle for 
attention. 
II. THE NECESSITY AND BREADTH OF TESTAMENTARY INTENT 
Intent is indisputably the heart of the will,   
the queen or empress of the testament; because the will doth rule and 
govern the testament, enlarge and restrain it, and in every respect 
moderate and direct the same, and is indeed the very efficient cause 
thereof.  The will, therefore, and meaning of the testator ought before 
all things to be sought for diligently, and being found ought to be 
observed faithfully.  And as to the sacred Anchor ought the judge to 
cleave unto it, pondering not the words but the meaning of the testator.  
For although no man be presumed to think otherwise than he speaketh, 
yet cannot every man utter all that he thinketh, and therefore are his 
words subject to his meaning.  And as the mind is before the voice, (for  
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we conceive before we speak), so is it of greater power; for the voice is 
to the mind as the servant is to the lord.14 
These words capture the centrality of testamentary intent to the entire 
probate enterprise, particularly when seeking what a will’s writer meant, 
but they obscure a fundamental feature of doctrine.  An ordinary 
document can be construed as soon as it is written.  A will, however, 
cannot—nor may one raise questions of its composition, construction, or 
revocation—until initially found to exist.  It is therefore useful to 
separate the discrete but overlapping primary and secondary functions 
that testamentary intent serves: driving the original finding of the will, 
with its construction deferred to thereafter.  Doing so recognizes that 
while intent may always have controlled in the latter function, its 
operational position vis-à-vis the formal rules invoked in finding that a 
will even exists has shifted from one of subordination, to relative 
equilibrium, to a current level of dominance compelling analytic care. 
A. Primary Purposes: The Constitutive Properties of Testamentary 
Intent  
With mitigating principles later discussed, a proffered document 
generally requires two components to qualify as a will: testamentary 
intent and formalities.15  Intent is expressed as but half of the equation.  
While overwhelming evidence of its existence may soften the rigor with 
which statutory compliance is assessed, traditional rules preclude the 
raising of a non-compliant document to the status of an effective will.16 
                                                     
 14. In re Estate of Shults, No. M2006-02013-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 490643, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 22, 2008) (quoting 1 JACK W. ROBINSON, PRITCHARD ON THE LAW OF WILLS AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES § 404 (6th ed. 2007)). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. f 
(1999) (“Executing a valid [attested] will requires the testator to manifest an intent to make a will 
and to comply with specified statutory formalities.” (citation omitted)); id. § 3.2 cmt. c 
(“Holographic wills as well as attested wills must be executed with testamentary intent.”); cf. Sewell 
v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537, 546 (1882) (“There are three essential requisites for every good and valid 
will; and these requisites are, perfect testamentary capacity, the intention to dispose of property in 
the event of death, and the formalities required by the statute.”). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Abrams’ Will, 77 P.2d 101, 103 (Okla. 1938) (“It is to be regretted that the 
intention of the testatrix is defeated by her failure to observe the statutory requirements, but to hold 
otherwise would in effect be to let down the bars to evils against which the statutory provisions are 
aimed.”). 
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The converse is also true, although with less attention paid it.17  A 
document bearing all statutory formalities might raise a pragmatic18 or 
legal19 presumption that testamentary intent exists.  Nevertheless, 
establishing its absence will usually prevent a will’s admission to probate 
or affect its vitality thereafter.20 
                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Clark v. Hugo, 107 S.E. 730, 733 (Va. 1921) (“The mere fact of [required acts], 
though strictly in accord with the requirements of the statute, is not conclusive upon [whether a will 
exists].  There must have been a testamentary intent.”), overruled in part by Poindexter v. Jones, 106 
S.E.2d 144 (Va. 1958); see also McBride v. McBride, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 476, 481 (1875) (“Unless 
[testamentary intent satisfactorily] appear[s], the paper must be rejected, however correct it may be 
in its form, however comprehensive in its details, however conformable to the otherwise declared 
intentions of the party, and although it may have been signed by him with all due solemnity.”  
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18. This is particularly true for attorney-assisted drafting and execution.  For example, a typical 
document would include the caption “Last Will and Testament” and continue restating the 
document’s purpose, such as, “I, John Doe . . . do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my 
Last Will and Testament hereby revoking all Wills and Codicils heretofore made by me.”  JEROME 
IRA SOLKOFF, 18A WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, ELDERLAW § 4.206 (3d ed. 2010).  Moreover, the 
ceremony might include recitation of, and the document would probably close with, an attestation 
clause and a self-proving affidavit reaffirming testamentary intent and securing other proofs.  See, 
e.g., MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 7, at 183–84 (discussing functions of formalities).  Few 
people would undergo such ceremony without holding testamentary intent.  Moreover, no contestant 
could assert the absence of intent if the best or even sole evidence of its non-existence had died with 
the decedent. 
 19. Some courts presume testamentary intent for documents meeting statutory requirements. 
See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence upon Issue of 
Testamentary Intent, 21 A.L.R.2d 319 (1952) (collecting cases that consider whether extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to establish testamentary intent).  Some courts have gone further: 
When [statutorily prescribed] formalities are observed, . . . the statute in itself and of 
itself attaches, and conclusively attaches, the animus testandi.  The requisition of 
extrinsic or additional evidence of its existence is to add to the requirements of the 
statute; and to receive such evidence to repel the existence of the intent would be to 
receive evidence against the statute. 
Barnewall v. Murrell, 18 So. 831, 839 (Ala. 1895).  Similarly, in In re Smith’s Estate, the court 
found that a statutorily compliant writing “of itself imports, and conclusively imports, the animus 
testandi, i.e., the mind to dispose, the firm and advised determination to make a testament, closing all 
inquiry as to the existence and manifestation of the intent.”  14 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Mich. 1944) (en 
banc) (quoting Barnewall, 18 So. at 839) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Restatement (Third) of Property tempers things, providing that the clear expression of 
testamentary intent “raises a strong (but not irrebuttable) presumption” of testamentary intent, itself 
rebuttable by “clear and convincing” evidence.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g (1999). 
 20. See, e.g., In re Sargavak’s Estate, 216 P.2d 850, 851–52 (Cal. 1950) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(noting that even instruments seemingly expressing testamentary intent may be proven by extrinsic 
evidence to have lacked it, such as through jest, threat or coercion, initiation rite, mistake, or 
hypothetical); Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499–500 (Mass. 1904) (finding no testamentary 
intent where a will was executed solely to induce beneficiary’s sexual relationship with testator).  
This is the majority view, as Professors Langbein and Waggoner note that “most Anglo-American 
courts will consider [whether testamentary intent exists] on the merits.”  John H. Langbein & 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in 
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The early English case of Lister v. Smith21 instructs.  The proponent 
offered a technically perfect document as a codicil to a prior will.22  The 
court nevertheless accepted parol evidence, including the testator’s 
alleged lifetime statements, that the codicil’s sole function was not to 
alter his testamentary disposition but rather to pressure a third party’s 
conduct while he was alive.23  Although he admitted that the case had 
given him “some anxiety” and remonstrated that courts must “guard with 
jealousy the sanction of a solemn act” through evidence both “cogent and 
conclusive,”24  Sir J.P. Wilde nevertheless ruled against the codicil: 
The momentous consequences of permitting parol evidence thus to 
outweigh the sanction of a solemn act are obvious.  It has a tendency to 
place all wills at the mercy of a parol story that the testator did not 
mean what he said.  On the other hand, if the fact is plainly and 
conclusively made out, that the paper which appears to be the record of 
a testamentary act, was in reality the offspring of a jest, or the result of 
a contrivance to effect some collateral object, and never seriously 
intended as a disposition of property, it is not reasonable that the Court 
should turn it into an effective instrument.  And such no doubt is the 
law.  There must be the animus testandi.25 
Intent and formalities, each critical, have thus often worked in 
tandem.  One may exist, or the other; both, or neither.  Casting them in 
counterpoise, as is often done, suggests that each component has always 
held equal weight in assessing a document for probate.  In reality, intent 
usually surrendered to formalities, an imbalance apparent in the 
asymmetry of some of this doctrine and, if listening hard, even in the 
language of the cases themselves.  For example, proof of compliance 
with formalities connotes or conclusively presumes that testamentary 
intent exists, whereas an even overwhelming body of proof establishing 
testamentary intent speaks very little to whether—and certainly raises no 
legal presumption that—the proffered document meets statutory 
formalities.  In both instances, formalities traditionally held the upper 
hand, yet it is both more likely and more devastating to have 
testamentary intent without the formalities than the reverse.  This 
                                                                                                                       
American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 541–42 (1982); see also 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 
§ 5.16 (2003) (“[B]y the majority view[,] parol evidence is admissible to show jest, joke and 
sham.”). 
 21. (1863) 164 Eng. Rep. 1282 (P.D.), 3 Sw. & Tr. 282. 
 22. Id. at 1285, 3 Sw. & Tr. at 287. 
 23. Id. at 1285, 3 Sw. & Tr. at 287–88. 
 24. Id. at 1285, 3 Sw. & Tr. at 287, 289. 
 25. Id. at 1285–86, 3 Sw. & Tr. at 288, 290–91. 
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observation simultaneously supports the ever-increasing role that intent 
now serves and demands its correlatively increased care. 
1. Wills Formalities and Intent 
Assuming temporarily that testamentary intent has been formed, a 
particular formal manner of its expression is either evidence of its 
existence—a standard—or the sole means to its legal effectuation—a 
rule.  That wills law traditionally embraces the latter approach counsels 
review of those formalities, their interplay with intent, and the interstitial 
goals they are thought to achieve. 
There are three staples to a valid will: (1) a writing (2) signed by the 
testator and (3) signed by a specified number of witnesses.26  Variations 
exist.  Some jurisdictions require that the testator sign the writing at its 
end, or “subscribe,” by contrast to its acceptance anywhere within the 
will that the decedent’s handwritten name appears.27  Differences remain 
over what third parties must observe before achieving witness status.  
Common options include the testator’s act of signing, the testator’s later 
acknowledgment of a prior signature, or the testator’s later 
acknowledgment of the document as a will.28  As these distinctions 
suggest, jurisdictions also vary on the physical relationship required 
among the testator and witnesses at assorted ceremonial points.29 
                                                     
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (1999). 
 27. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2005); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 
(West 2005).  Subscription can be relevant even when the statute only requires signature, as by 
assessing whether the decedent’s handwritten name in an exordium clause would well-enough 
express either authenticating intent for the signature or testamentary intent for the will.  See, e.g., 
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 18 N.E. 2d 209, 210–11 (Ill. 1938); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
& OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmts. j, k (1999) (discussing the effect of handwritten name 
and the general rule against freestanding signatures without other evidence to the testator’s intent). 
 28. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(3) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 2011).  
Acknowledgment of the document as a will is the functional equivalent of the publication demanded 
in some jurisdictions where the testator expressly or impliedly “declares” to the witnesses that the 
subject instrument is her will, so it does not require that its contents be revealed.  See, e.g., IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 633.279 (West 1992) (“An attested will may be made self-proved at the time of its 
execution, or at any subsequent date, by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the 
affidavits of the witnesses . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104 (West 2009) (permitting testator to 
signify to attesting witnesses that instrument is testator’s will by acknowledgment of testator’s 
signature).  Note, however, the effect of will acknowledgment or publication on testamentary intent: 
for either to occur, the publisher must have held it.  See, e.g., id. 
 29. See, e.g., 2 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.126 (2003) (discussing requirements of 
physical proximity between witnesses and blind testator).  Aside from state-specific rules about who 
must be in the presence of whom and when, less easily answered is the meaning of “presence” itself.  
Some jurisdictions, including those enacting the Uniform Probate Code, merely require one to be in 
the “conscious presence” or “within the range of senses” of the other.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. 
 
GUZMAN FINAL 1/4/2012  8:08 AM 
314 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
Every jurisdiction accepts the “attested” or witnessed will, which 
rarely leaves room for question over testamentary intent.  Most states, 
however, also recognize one or more less formal—thus potentially less 
reliable—methods of its expression.  More than half allow the 
holographic or unattested will30 by accepting into probate a handwritten 
and unwitnessed document that has been signed by the decedent.31  
Twenty-one jurisdictions allow nuncupative or oral wills,32 although 
certain constrictions greatly curtail their utility.33 
2. Mediating Formalities and Intent 
Legal requirements for effecting a valid testamentary disposition are 
absurd unless they serve relevant ends.  The authoritative work of Ashbel 
Gulliver and Catherine Tilson, later extended by John Langbein, 
recognizes the intermediate goals of execution formalities as protective, 
evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling, which in turn target the ultimate 
identification and effectuation of the decedent’s testamentary intent.34 
                                                                                                                       
Cunningham, 83 N.W. 58, 59–60 (Minn. 1900) (finding conscious presence where “[t]he signing 
was within the sound of the testator’s voice”).  Stricter jurisdictions embrace the “line of sight or 
vision” test, under which one must see or have been able to see the other’s specific act had she 
looked.  See, e.g., Newton v. Palmour, 266 S.E.2d 208, 209–10 (Ga. 1980) (“In order for the will to 
be signed by the subscribing witnesses ‘in the presence of’ the testator, . . . it is enough that the 
testator, without changing his position, might have seen the will being attested . . . .”). 
 30. Twenty-seven states generally recognize the holographic will.  Steven Clowney, In Their 
Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & 
EST. L.J. 27, 34 & n.25 (2008) (gathering state statutes that recognize holographic wills).  See 
generally MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 7, § 4.4 (discussing the requirements of holographic 
wills).  For statutory specifics, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. a (1999). 
 31. Jurisdictional differences roughly sort into first-, second-, and third-generation schemes.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. a (1999).  
First-generation statutes essentially demand the will to be “entirely” or “wholly” in the decedent’s 
handwriting and often also require a date.  Id.  Second- and third-generation statutes require only that 
the will’s material “provisions” or “portions,” respectively, be in the decedent’s handwriting.  Id. 
 32. See generally id. § 3.2 statutory note 1. 
 33. Oklahoma’s statute is typical: oral wills are limited to personal property not valued over 
$1,000; the will must be proved by two persons present at its declaration, one of whom must have 
been asked by the testator to witness it; and the testator must have been actually engaged in military 
service and suffer fear, actual peril, or expectation of imminent death.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, 
§§ 46, 51 (West 2003).  They must be reduced to writing within thirty days and offered for probate 
within six months of utterance. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 91 (West 2003). 
 34. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE 
L.J. 1, 5–13 (1941); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 491–98 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substantial Compliance]. 
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So viewed, a will’s formalities offer protection in one form or 
another—generally, protecting the decedent’s testamentary intent; 
conjunctively, protecting the decedent from the system, others, and 
herself; protecting the system from complexity and wasteful litigation; 
and protecting third parties with interest in the estate.  Formalities serve 
evidentiary functions by providing a reliable written and often witnessed 
expression of the decedent’s intent.35  The cautionary function shields the 
decedent from her own caprice or improvidence by imposing ceremonial 
safeguards, such as subscription and publication, to ensure that the 
endeavor was considered and deliberate.36  Attestation modestly 
contributes to the protective function by deterring the incidence or ease 
of others’ wrongful interference with intent.37  And by normalizing the 
form through which it is expressed, the channeling function provides a 
recognizable legal framework for both testamentary intent and the act 
designed to achieve it.38  The interplay between formality and function is 
both self-supporting and mutually reinforcing. 
Debate continues over whether the access benefits conferred by 
holographic wills outweigh their evidentiary and functional costs.39  
Whether they should exist, that they presently do in a majority of states40 
suggests a not-insignificant legislative confidence in their propriety as a 
transfer form and thus their ability to convey and effectuate fully formed 
intent.  Moreover, if the current set of formalities for attested wills 
overprotects anyway,41 then the holograph might deserve celebration for 
its populism, rather than mere tolerance as a legal annoyance owing more 
to inertia than policy. 
In establishing a rule–goal relationship, one extreme would 
superordinate a heavy dose of formalism to the virtual exclusion of intent 
                                                     
 35. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 34, at 492–93. 
 36. Id. at 495. 
 37. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 10. 
 38. See Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for 
a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 456 (2002) 
(noting that “if formality requirements are well chosen to provide reliable evidence, ensure a well-
considered decision, and protect against imposition, effective channeling will enhance the beneficial 
evidentiary, cautionary, and protective effects of the rules”). 
 39. See, e.g., Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic 
Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 126–27 (2006) (concluding that “holographic wills are more trouble 
than they are worth”); Clowney, supra note 30, at 31–32, 71 (defending the holograph against claims 
that it is an inherent litigation-producer). 
 40. See Clowney, supra note 30, at 34 & n.25 (gathering state statutes that recognize 
holographic wills). 
 41. See Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 159 (1989). 
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by assuming that the sole assurance that testamentary intent had been 
formed and exercised would be to identify a set of rigid rules and then 
demand their strict compliance.  This approach effectively treats 
requirements as ends in themselves.  While such crystallization might 
create transaction and litigation efficiencies, it places an inordinate 
premium on the intent-reflective ability of one precise set of 
requirements to establish intent.  Further, this too often occurs at the 
expense of a particular decedent’s actual wishes.  If the channel is too 
narrow, no one will get through.  The older cases reflecting this view, 
along with some more recent examples, are legion, well-documented, 
and deserve the disparagement they invite.42 
The other extreme would discard all rules to favor underlying intent 
in each individual case and permit its showing in any form, irrespective 
of its oral or written expression or even original manifestation at all.  
This design suffers its own weaknesses and does not enjoy support by 
even the most ardently intent-driven advocates.43  While an ad hoc, pure 
intent approach would obviously uphold intent as paramount, it would do 
so at the cost of vastly increased likelihood of error or fraud in its 
creation, assertion, or scope, and litigation over the “answers” to each.  
The first approach looks like a lockdown; the latter, a free-for-all.  
Testamentary intent remains within the equation both ways, but as tilted 
way up or way down on the fulcrum of the document’s admission. 
                                                     
 42. The absurdities generated by rigidity, variously labeled mechanical, silly, dishonest, harsh, 
relentless, unfair, and even unforgiveable, are comprehensively recounted in influential sources.  
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills: The Restatement 
of Wills Delivers New Tools (and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers, PROB. & PROP. Jan.–Feb., at 28, 
28 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Curing Execution Errors] (using the example of a will invalidated 
because a witness prematurely left to use the washroom); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless 
Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors] (providing 
examples of formalism defeating intent); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement 
for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 545 n.30 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Attestation Requirement] 
(same); Lindgren, Formalism, supra note 9, at 1011–12 (same); Bruce H. Mann, Essay, Formalities 
and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1994) [hereinafter 
Mann, Probate Code] (same); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills 
Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 47–48 (1985) [hereinafter Mann, Wills Adjudication] (same); C. 
Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the 
New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 
FLA. L. REV. 167, 222–29 (1991) (same); J.G. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of 
Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 561–62 (1987) (same). 
 43. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 42, at 6 (“To eliminate hardship 
without altering the rule of strict compliance would require abolishing the Wills Act formalities 
entirely.  But a legal system should be able to preserve relatively high levels of formality, in order to 
enhance the safe harbor that is created for the careful testator who complies fully, without having to 
invalidate every will in which the testator does not reach the harbor.”). 
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3. Mediating the Extremes 
Middle ground exists.  For example, jurisdictions could retain many 
formalities but temper their stridency through the substantial-compliance 
doctrine, reduce the number of rules with which testators must comply 
but retain strict compliance for those that remain,44 or relax both levels 
with fewer rules and looser compliance standards.  These options 
essentially place rules and intent on roughly equal footing and correct 
some of the rule-heavy imbalance earlier described.  Indeed, whenever 
the law favors formalities over desire or when their equivalence truly 
exists, there is no need for severely heightened assessment of intent: its 
presence will either be presumed (through rule compliance) or irrelevant 
(by strict default), or it will, on balance, guide determination over 
whether the rules (or their intermediate goals) have been met “enough.” 
But here is where intent has surged.  The Restatement (Third) of 
Property and the 2008 iteration of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) have 
tilted acutely toward intent by stripping rules to a minimum45 and, more 
importantly, permitting even the few left standing to be dispensed with 
entirely upon clear and convincing evidence “that the decedent intended 
                                                     
 44. This seems to have been the approach taken by the 1969 Uniform Probate Code: 
The Code’s approach was not to encourage courts to abandon their strict construction of 
the formalities prescribed, but rather to reduce the number and refine the scope of those 
formalities so that, if strict construction were employed, “inequities” in individual cases 
would occur less frequently and would be justified by the importance of the interests 
protected by the formal requirements that were retained. 
In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1009 (N.J. 1987).  The facts of Peters provide a good 
example.  The court noted that its will-execution statute had been “rife with . . . formal 
encrustations” before amendment in 1978 removed certain presence requirements for validity.  Id. at 
1009–10.  But in refusing to probate a will signed after the decedent’s death, the court observed: 
It cannot be overemphasized that [by its amendments,] the Legislature . . . did not 
dispense with the requirement that the execution of a will be witnessed.  Indeed, it is 
arguable that as the number of formalities have been reduced, those retained by the 
Legislature have assumed even greater importance, and demand at least the degree of 
scrupulous adherence required under the former statute. 
Id. at 1010.  The New Jersey Supreme Court later adopted the substantial-compliance doctrine in In 
re Will of Ranney.  589 A.2d 1339, 1346 (N.J. 1991).  The legislature later codified the harmless-
error exception.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2 (West Supp. 2011). 
 45. For example, under section 2-502(a) of the Uniform Probate Code, an attested will must 
merely be written and signed by the testator or a proxy, and it must also either be (1) signed by two 
others within a reasonable time of witnessing the testator’s signature, acknowledgment of the 
signature, or acknowledgment of the will, or (2) acknowledged by the testator before a notary or 
other legally authorized person.  8 U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 2011).  Thus, there are no overt requirements 
of publication, subscription, request to sign, or presence between the testator, the witnesses, and each 
other. 
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the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”46  The 
presumable result is that more wills will be admitted to probate: (1) a 
larger number will initially conform to formal requirements; (2) of those 
that do not, fewer would-be contestants will determine that payoff 
warrants litigation risks and costs; and (3) some percentage of actually 
challenged documents will be saved by the dispensing-power backstop 
such as through the colloquy with which this Article began. 
Because both the UPC and the Restatement retain rules, ramp up 
proof of intent in their absence to “clear and convincing,”47 and cast the 
dispensing power as an exception to formalities rather than an initial 
open-ended standard, they fall short of representing undiluted intent.48  
Its power, however, is undeniable.  And gates swing both ways.  Because 
testamentary intent has assumed such dominance in an apparently 
upward trajectory49 and as compounded by rule relaxation in other 
                                                     
 46. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 146 (1988).  This provision 
apparently applies in seven states: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-503 (West 2009); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 560:2-503 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503 (West 2006); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 72-2-523 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 2004). 
 47. The drafters assert that by placing the burden of proof upon the proponent and requiring its 
discharge to be “policed with rigor” through clear and convincing evidence rather than the usual 
preponderance standard, “[s]ection 2-503 imposes procedural standards appropriate to the 
seriousness of the issue.”  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 147 (1998).  
As is later discussed, this provision arguably grants with one hand what it takes by the other, which 
it then places too heavily upon the intent–formality scale.  See infra note 229 and accompanying 
text. 
 48. See id.  For example, while the Uniform Probate Code is technically agnostic on point, its 
commentary suggests that both documentary writings and signatures are indispensable.  Id. § 2-502 
cmt.  As a practical matter, most documents capable of supporting clear and convincing proof of 
their writers’ intent to endorse them as wills will probably meet many, if not all, of the formalities 
anyway. 
An interesting comparison can be drawn with the Uniform Probate Code section 2-513, as 
amended in 2008, under which an unattested but signed non-holographic document disposing of 
non-cash personal property might be given testamentary effect if the decedent’s will referred to it.  8 
U.L.A. 158 (1998).  Aside from noting that the list itself could not possibly meet section 2-503 
standards, the original provision permitting the document to be unsigned was modified in 1990 on 
the theory that unsigned documents do not provide as much evidence of testamentary intent as 
signed ones.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.9 (1999) (providing that a will may devise property even though it does not meet the elements of 
incorporation by reference). 
 49. See, e.g., MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 7, § 4.1 (discussing “liberalizing trend” in wills 
requirements law); Clowney, supra note 30, at 37 & n.42 (noting the submerged trend of increased 
acceptance of holographs, which inherently favor intent over formalities).  Although few states have 
adopted dispensing power, both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement hold sway beyond 
enactment borders.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE prefatory note (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 364 
(noting that it has been “enacted in close to complete form in about twenty states but influential in 
virtually all”); Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting 
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contexts,50 defining it and its boundaries has become essential whether 
one’s motivation is to enhance a document’s admission to probate or 
impede it. 
In addition to tracing the ascendance of intent, this overview of wills 
law suggests some of the doctrinal perversity to follow.  Courts will find 
testamentary intent in documents and perhaps admit them to probate 
even when they do not comply with stated rules, and disaffirm 
testamentary intent to deny probate to attested documents even when 
they do.  Their readiness to both override the presumptive intent created 
by perfect formalities, yet find intent in their absence, exposes the 
weakness of claiming that acts, intents, and purposes will always 
perfectly align.  And yet, aside from its acknowledged importance, 
particularly for partially or fully holographic instruments, courts 
routinely resist finding testamentary intent—even when the document 
does comply with stated rules and no evidence of sham intent exists—by 
legalistically cramping its definition, limiting sources of proof, and 
heightening burdens of its establishment. 
B. Secondary Purposes: The Constructional Properties of Testamentary 
Intent 
1. Will Composition 
In addition to its growing centrality to a will’s creation, intent figures 
prominently in a series of loosely grouped doctrines aimed at discerning 
the acts or documents that constitute the will.  Under integration, a will 
initially comprises any pages actually present at execution and intended 
to be a part of it.51  Two intents are therefore required: testamentary and 
“integrative.”  Relatedly, an extrinsic document that is not physically 
present at execution can be incorporated into a will that reflects 
                                                                                                                       
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 599 (1985) (noting that legislatures in fourteen states have 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code). 
 50. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction 
Between Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2005) 
(lamenting the growing tendency of modern courts to collapse will construction and interpretation 
with over-flexibility and “limitless discretion,” and noting the “increasing[] relax[ation]” of rules 
over the admission of extrinsic evidence). 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.5 (1999).  
For examples of this doctrine applied, see Walsh v. St. Joseph’s Home for the Aged, 303 A.2d 691 
(Del. Ch. 1973), and In re Estate of Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1962). 
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incorporating intent and sufficiently describes the document.52  Again, 
two intents are needed: testamentary and “incorporating.” 
The doctrine of acts with independent significance completes generic 
will provisions with conduct.53  For example, the effect of a will stating 
“whatever car I own at my death to my widow” could change over time 
depending on the testator’s conduct in buying and selling cars and in 
marrying and divorcing people.  Although such conduct functionally 
works as a post-execution amendment to the will, reexecution is 
unnecessary if the acts were intended to hold significance distinct from 
the will itself.54 
Each doctrine involves second-level intent inquiries but also, in 
varying degrees, inquiry into whether original testamentary intent exists 
at all.  The number, existence, and source of documents or acts to be 
effectuated within probate are irrelevant without a purported will—
something must anchor testamentary intent to any candidate for 
integration or incorporation.  The presence of that primary intent often 
turns on the subsidiary doctrines themselves, as where two arguably 
testamentary documents exist, but alone neither sufficiently reflects 
intent nor adequately complies with the rules. 
2. Will Construction and Revocation 
Upon the establishment of a will and its composite parts, intent 
remains key but takes a slightly different thrust.  No longer employed to 
assess whether the decedent intended the subject document to be a will, it 
now illuminates its meaning with principals of interpretation and 
construction. 
Here, intent reigns supreme and, unlike its role in will formation, 
arguably always has.  For example, contrary to older doctrine explicitly 
                                                     
 52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.6 (1999); 
see, e.g., In re Estate of Came, 529 A.2d 962, 964–65 (N.H. 1987) (describing the requirements to 
incorporate a document into a will by reference); In re Estate of Shults, No. M2006-02013-COA-R3-
CV, 2008 WL 490643, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2008) (providing that a document can be 
incorporated if properly identified and the court determines it is the intent of the decedent).  Some 
jurisdictions demand further that the writing both actually exist and be expressly referred to as 
existing in the will.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Meskimen, 235 N.E.2d, 619, 622 (Ill. 1968) (adopting 
the additional requirement); In re Estate of Erbach, 164 N.W.2d 238, 242–43 (Wis. 1969) (noting 
but not adopting additional requirement).  The Uniform Probate Code relaxes these requirements by 
embracing the “2-513 list.”  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-513 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 158. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.7 (1999). 
 54. See id. 
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biased toward heirs over beneficiaries,55 modern jurisprudence generally 
furthers, sometimes statutorily, construction so as to avoid intestacy and 
place the testator’s intent above all comers.  Unfortunately, the 
application of such rules is usually inapposite to primary testamentary-
intent determination; the rules usually apply to interpret a valid will 
rather than legitimize an otherwise marginal document.56  For example, 
in In re Will of Smith, the appellate court invoked the doctrine of 
probable intent to find that a holographically compliant letter to an 
attorney should constitute a will.57  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed.58  The court admonished that “the doctrine of probable intent is 
available only to interpret, but not to validate, a will.  [The doctrine] 
comes into play only after a will is found to be valid.”59  One might 
question the logic of a jurisdiction’s willingness to engage the tough 
questions on constructional levels—as through presumptions against 
intestacy and careful location of intent—but not operational levels, the 
very foundation of the testamentary exercise.60 
                                                     
 55. See, e.g., Thompkins v. Randall, 150 S.E. 249, 251 (Va. 1929) (favoring heirs when 
testamentary intent was unclear). 
 56. Consider a trio of Oklahoma statutes: “Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be 
preferred which will prevent a total intestacy.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 160 (West 2003).  “In 
case of uncertainty, arising upon the face of a will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the 
testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances 
under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations.”  Id. § 152.  “Several testamentary 
instruments, executed by the same testator, are to be taken and construed together as one 
instrument.”  Id. § 154.  Combined, the statutes seem to favor testate succession—and, thus, 
testamentary intent—over intestacy, permit non-documentary evidence to locate it, and support the 
validation and integration of multiple documents of questionable compliance and intent into a single 
testamentary instrument bearing both. 
But case law forecloses the argument.  For example, section 154 raises the interesting question 
of whether the term “testamentary instrument” means “validly executed,” such that two 
noncompliant documents could not be integrated into a single, compliant one.  On one hand, the 
answer seems to be yes, as per the court’s admonition in In re Paull’s Estate that section 154 “deals 
with the interpretation of wills,” and thus is inapplicable unless a will is initially found.  254 P.2d 
357, 359 (Okla. 1950).  As a later case reinforces, “an instrument which is not a will does not 
become one until executed as required by law.”  Hooker v. Barton, 284 P.2d 708, 710 (Okla. 1955).  
Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s liberal construction of a will as essentially anything 
“testamentary in character” suggests that section 154, in using the phrase “testamentary instrument” 
rather than the word “will,” is even more clearly applicable to any instrument with a testamentary 
flair.  Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928, 930 (Okla. 1954) (per curiam).  This paves the path for 
many noncompliant documents reflecting varying degrees of testamentary intent to be read together 
as a single, compliant one. 
 57. 528 A.2d 918, 920 (N.J. 1987). 
 58. Id. at 922. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 60. Cf. In re Estate of Williams, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Such prior 
declarations of intent to make a will are admissible when the attempt is not to explain an ambiguity 
but to show the testamentary character of a letter.”). 
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As with effecting a valid will, revoking one also requires intent, this 
time revocatory, plus a sufficient act.61  Such acts include express or 
implied revocation through the execution of a later will, or engaging in 
certain conduct, such as “burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or 
destroying” the former instrument.62  Where direct and, indeed, written 
evidence of testamentary intent does not exist, neither will the will itself.  
But where direct evidence of revocatory intent does not exist, courts ease 
evidentiary burdens by indulging its presumption for a will known to 
have been in the testator’s possession before death and either not found 
or found mutilated thereafter.63  No witnesses are necessary to raise the 
presumption, and the type and level of proof required to rebut it will 
vary.64 
III. THE ELUSIVENESS OF TESTAMENTARY INTENT 
Anything that has become so undeniably central to a will and sure to 
only grow in relevance as technologies expand should be capable of clear 
explication on both definitional and doctrinal levels.  For testamentary 
intent, this is not the case.  Moreover, even where answers arguably 
exist, they are not always as sound as they could be.  That an answer is 
clear does not mean it is good, and discordant policy merely exacerbates 
the lack of clarity. 
A. Testamentary Intent Defined 
The courts have said again and again that the test whether or not an 
instrument is testamentary . . . is whether it was executed with . . . 
testamentary intent.  While this is a standard form of orthodox 
statement, it is in itself of little help since it does not explain what . . . 
testamentary intent is.65 
How peculiar to require the indefinable.  State statutes rarely define 
testamentary intent.  Instead, if they speak of it at all, they merely imply 
its requisite nature by assigning to contestants the burden to prove its 
absence66 or directing the sources from which it can be drawn.67  As 
                                                     
 61. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 151 (1998). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Evans v. May, 923 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating the rule). 
 64. See id. 
 65. 1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 5.6 (footnote omitted). 
 66. The Alaska Statute is representative, particularly of jurisdictions having adopted the 
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candidly recognized by the Montana courts, judicial pronouncement 
must fill this legislative vacuum: “There is no definite fixed rule for 
determining testamentary intent, [and] each case must stand on its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances.”68  Notwithstanding the merits and 
demerits of flexibility, its overlay atop already indeterminate legal 
precepts results in unnecessary disarray.  What is more, to the extent that 
precedent functionally creates and entrenches both definition and 
doctrine, the foregoing statement is possibly untrue. 
Perhaps “false security [inheres in] precise definitions,”69 especially 
given the correlative truism that “[t]here ‘is no magic in the words 
themselves.’”70  Moreover, the subjectivity of any intent, testamentary or 
otherwise, often makes its evidentiary capture difficult to achieve.  As 
can be stated more generally of the holographic will itself, imprecision 
may be unavoidable yet desirable whenever law and life intersect so 
vividly.  Nevertheless, a second more critical casualty of definitional 
amorphism is comprehension of the fundamentals that the words try to 
define.  As such, imprecise and short-handed wordplay hinders both 
precision and understanding.  Circularity is unmistakable when 
testamentary intent is equated with animus testandi and cast roughly as 
the “intent to make a will,”71 but the definition of a “will” is either 
                                                                                                                       
Uniform Probate Code: “Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary 
intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake or revocation.”  ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.16.170 (West 2007) (emphasis added).  In other jurisdictions, testamentary intent may be a 
component of the factum of the will, to be established or averred by its proponent in the course of 
admission to probate.  See In re Will of Smith, 528 A.2d 918, 920 (N.J. 1987) (in denying probate to 
a letter written by the decedent to her attorney, the court noted that “[a]lthough the statute does not 
allude to it, testamentary intent has always been a prerequisite to admission of an instrument to 
probate”). 
 67. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08-02(3) (West 2008) (“Intent that the document 
constitute the testator’s will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic 
wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator’s handwriting.”). 
 68. In re Estate of Johnson, 60 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Mont. 2002) (citing In re Augestad’s Estate, 
106 P.2d 1087, 1088 (Mont. 1940)). 
 69. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND OTHER PRINCIPLES OF 
SUCCESSION INCLUDING INTESTACY AND ADMINISTRATION OF DECEDENTS’ ESTATES 2 (2d ed. 
1953). 
 70. 1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 1.5 (footnote omitted) (discussing early real versus personal 
property distinctions in the terms “will” and “testament”). 
 71. See, e.g., Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Ark. 2004) (noting a 
document was found defective for “lack[ing] the required animus testandi or intent to make a will”); 
In re Kemp’s Will, 186 A. 890, 894 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936) (“Animus testandi is the intention or 
serious purpose to make a will.”); Kidd v. Gunter, 551 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Va. 2001) (“‘[T]here must 
be a concurrence of the animus testandi and the animus signandi—that is, the intention to make a 
will and the intention to sign the instrument as and for a will.’”  (quoting Hamlet v. Hamlet, 32 
S.E.2d 729, 732 (Va. 1945))); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 461 (W. Va. 1982) (noting 
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tautological as an expression of or document written with testamentary 
intent72, facile,73 or capable of broad variance.  Non-definitional 
“definitions” hurt more than they help. 
Usage of the word “will,” so critical to many formulations of 
testamentary intent, is independently susceptible to numerous and even 
conflicting meanings74 ranging between verb and noun, inquiry and 
assurance, and desire and document.75  Even when limited to use as a 
noun, that the word continues this definitional spectrum on content, 
expressive, and intent levels can confound one’s search for either its 
meaning or the intent to make it. 
1. Content Variance 
While one’s generic “will” may broadly express wishes about any 
subject in the world,76 only two categories compete in attempting a 
                                                                                                                       
that “there are some dispositive words demonstrating an intent to make a will . . . which indicate, to 
some extent, testamentary intent”); see also Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 34, at 
491 (observing that “[the assorted wills doctrines] are directed to two broad issues of testamentary 
intent[, the first being whether] the decedent intend[ed] to make a will”). 
 72. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-2(17) (West 2011) (“‘Will’ means the legal declaration of 
an individual’s testamentary intention regarding that individual’s property or other matters.”); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-1-201(52) (2004) (“‘Will’ means an instrument, including a codicil, executed 
with testamentary intent and in the manner prescribed by this code . . . .”); In re Daniel J. 
Rosenbaum Trust, No. 81213, 2003 WL 1849141, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2003) (“Although 
there is no specific statutory definition of a ‘will,’ case law and statutes make it clear that ‘a will 
must be in writing, executed with certain formalities and by its language demonstrate, at the 
minimum, a testamentary intent, i.e., a disposition of property to take effect only at death.’”  
(quoting In re Estate of Ike, 454 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982))). 
 73. Some statutory definitions of the will essentially observe that it stands for a last will and 
testament or includes the word “codicil.”  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 302(22) (West 2006) 
(defining will as a last will and testament including a codicil); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-3-59 (West 
1999) (noting that the term “will” includes codicils); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:1-2 (West 2007) 
(defining will as a last will and testament and including codicils). 
 74. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1354 (10th ed. 1997) (reflecting 
such disparate notions as “desire, choice, willingness, consent, . . . refusal”; “habitual action or 
natural tendency or disposition”; “futurity”; “capability or sufficiency”; “probability”; 
“determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness”; “inevitability”; “command, exhortation, or 
injunction”). 
 75. For example, as a verb, it can connote wish or intent that may never happen, or it can 
indicate the declarant’s belief or even warrant that something is certain to occur.  Id.  Both usages 
suggest futurity; one suggests but cannot promise inevitability.  Compare “I will—action, formed and 
deliberate intent; outcome unclear but within declarant’s control—fairly exercise my choice, will—
action, interrogative, outcome unclear—she?”  Moreover, it can also be used as a generic synonym 
for the verbs “bequeath” or “devise,” which may mean that some act—although lacking ultimate 
effect—has already occurred: “I have willed—completed but revocable action based on intent—my 
real property to my brother and my personal property to my sister.” 
 76. For example: “It is my will—current desire—that she should listen to me.” 
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workable definition of testamentary intent: content-broad desire related 
to some consequence of death77 or a content-narrow direction requiring 
the actual deathtime disposition of property.78  The second definition is 
initially more intuitive than the first, in that people justifiably think of 
                                                     
 77. Early sources illustrate this.  Blackstone defines the will as “‘the legal declaration of a 
man’s intention which he wills to be performed after his death.’” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 499–500 (1768).  In like vein, Henry Swinburne states 
that “[a] Last Will is a lawful disposition of that which any would have done after Death.”  HENRY 
SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS 12 (5th ed. 1728).  Whether 
Swinburne’s term “lawful disposition” means legal, not unlawful, or legally effectuated, statutorily 
compliant, it seems that both definitions would encompass documents containing no property 
disposition at all, and they could also ostensibly embrace such non-testamentary transactions as 
death-conditional deeds.  Indeed, it is on the latter point that objection to the definition has been 
raised.  ATKINSON, supra note 69, at 2.  Traditionalists would argue that by definition, “will 
substitutes” are not wills, but rather their inter vivos approximations.  Thus, intent to create them 
could not be deemed “testamentary intent” for purposes of admitting such a document to probate.  
Given the proliferation of will substitutes after Professor Atkinson wrote his treatise in 1953, such a 
broad definition of testamentary intent could have ranging effect, particularly where the intent to 
create the will substitute was not matched with the formalities through which to accomplish it.  On 
the rise of the will substitute generally, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the 
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). 
An Oklahoma court discussing the applicability of a will doctrine to a revocable trust echoes 
the concern: 
[T]o [incorporate assorted deathtime transfers into the will] “would mean that joint 
tenancy deeds, joint bank accounts, bonds payable on death to another, and similar 
instruments, would constitute the ‘will’ of [a] decedent and would have to be admitted to 
probate.  It is clear that such documents are not a part of the probate estate and are not a 
part of a decedent’s will.” 
Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75, 78 (Okla. 1981) (Hargrave, J., dissenting) (third 
alteration in original) (quoting In re Estate of Meskimen, 235 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ill. 1968)). 
 78. This definition is commonly stated, even if not commonly applied.  1 THOMAS JARMAN, A 
TREATISE ON WILLS 29 (7th ed. 1930) (“‘A will,’ . . . ‘is an instrument by which a person makes a 
disposition of his property to take effect after his decease, and which is in its own nature ambulatory 
and revocable during his life.”  (citations omitted)); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 555 (7th ed. 1851) (“A will is a disposition of real and personal property to take effect after the 
death of the testator.”).  Although often in derogation of or preceding relevant statute, many cases 
accord.  See Twilley v. Durkee, 211 P. 668, 673 (Colo. 1923) (“[U]nder our statute, unless it 
disposes of property, [a written instrument] to take effect at the testator’s death, is not a will . . . .”); 
Mallory v. Mallory, 862 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ky. 1993) (“[E]xpression of testamentary intent . . . 
require[s] 1) a disposing of property 2) which takes effect after death.”  (citing Simon v. Wildt, 84 
Ky. 157 (1886))); Succession of White, 961 So. 2d 439, 441 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“To be a valid . . . 
will, a document must meet the requisites of form and contain testamentary intent, which is to say, 
‘it must, by its own language, show on its face that it purports to dispose of the property of the 
testator on his death.’”  (quoting Succession of Shows, 158 So. 2d 293, 295 (La. Ct. App. 1963))); In 
re Estate of Blackburn, 253 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“In assessing testamentary 
intent, ‘[the testator’s legal understanding is immaterial] so long as the document demonstrates . . . 
clear intention to dispose of . . . property after . . . death.’”  (quoting In re Meade, 156 S.W.3d 841, 
843–44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004))); In re Estate of Allen, 301 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. App. 2009) 
(noting that testamentary intent depends on the maker’s intention to create an irrevocable disposition 
of property). 
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wills as vehicles through which to transmit their estates.79  But as wills 
often do much more than that, this common but narrowly drawn 
definition could cut many estate-related documents out of the will label 
and, thus, fail to reflect the requisite intent to make one. 
For example, consider an unambiguous and validly attested 
document revoking all prior wills, naming a personal representative for 
the estate and a guardian for minor children, suggesting an attorney, 
disinheriting all descendants, clarifying the identity of the current spouse, 
but failing to dispose of any property.  In jurisdictions following the 
more narrow definition, the document could not itself be a will and, 
therefore, could not (1) integrate any other pages present at its execution 
and intended for inclusion; (2) incorporate any other document by 
reference; (3) republish any earlier will by codicil, with potential 
downstream effects on subsidiary doctrines such as interested-witnesses 
analysis; (4) support its own subsequent codicil; (5) discharge the 
obligations of a statute demanding disinheritance of descendants to be 
clear on a will’s face; or perhaps most shockingly, (6) accomplish its 
revocatory intent in a jurisdiction limiting revocation to physical act or 
subsequent will.  The net result of such “non-will” status treats it as but a 
precatory expression of intent, which renders it inadmissible to probate 
and binding on none.80 
With varying corrective, most state statutes recognize the 
shortcomings of a purely disposition-based definition and lean toward 
the first option above.  Compare, for example, a limited definition of a 
will that excludes merely revocatory documents and assumes that no 
instrument is “testamentary” unless making a positive disposition of 
property upon death81 with an expansive definition that embraces “any 
                                                     
 79. This predilection toward wills as positive, dispositive acts is reflected in the lingering 
majority rule refusing to effectuate so-called “negative wills” that deny rather than grant beneficiary 
status.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184, 186–87 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (“[A] testator 
cannot disinherit his heirs by words alone, but in order to do so, the property must be given to 
somebody else.”). 
 80. See generally 1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 1.5 (discussing legal effect of definitions of wills 
and testaments on realty and personalty).  A few arguments might be tried.  For example, when a 
testator limits an heirship or revokes a will, property implicitly transfers to others—prior will 
beneficiaries upon revival, other heirs if not.  Moreover, if the jurisdiction nominally transfers 
ownership to executors pending final estate distribution, designating or changing that individual may 
suffice as property disposition to maneuver the statute.  Finally, the jurisdiction could determine that 
while not a “will,” the document’s compliance with testamentary formalities permits incorporation 
or republication of documents with their own dispositive provisions so as to fulfill the definitional 
requirement.  But these possibilities are not given and, either way, could engender wasteful litigation 
in asserting them. 
 81. See In re Estate of Gushwa, 197 P.3d 1, 3–5 (N.M. 2008). 
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instrument, including any codicil or other testamentary instrument . . . 
[that] disposes of personal or real property, appoints a personal 
representative, conservator, guardian, or trustee, revokes or revises an 
earlier executed testamentary instrument, or encompasses any one or 
more of such objects or purposes.”82  Ironically, if the disposition-based 
view is too narrow, the alternative may be too broad. 
2. Expressive Variance 
Will definitions also differ over the format within which a document 
must be expressed,83 encompassing either a format-intermediate written 
expression of desire84 or a format-narrow and statutorily compliant 
written expression of desire.85  The first definition recognizes the 
difference between an invalid will and a valid one.  Under the second, 
the phrase “valid will” is redundant, and “invalid will” is oxymoronic. 
For example, consider the breadth of the statement that “an 
instrument may be too defective to be entitled to probate but if it is 
testamentary in character it is a will.”86  Such expansive language ignores 
formalities as long as the relevant document exists.  Moreover, all will  
 
                                                     
 82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2209(53) (2009).  One might elude this difficulty if it is true that 
“[i]nstruments which have been intended to have testamentary effect have been considered to be 
wills though they make no effective disposition of property.”  ATKINSON, supra note 69, at 3; see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. a (1999) 
(broadly defining a will); L.S.T., Annotation, Character of Instrument as Will, or Its Admissibility to 
Probate as Such, as Affected by Its Failure to Make Any Disposition of Property or by Fact that 
There Is No Beneficiary Entitled to Take Thereunder, 147 A.L.R. 636 (1943) (discussing whether 
instruments that do not dispose of any property are wills or are admissible to probate). 
 83. Oral wills require no document, but are so limited and rare as to not require additional 
discussion.  Case law, however, occasionally loosens the tie with inarticulate language.  See, e.g., 
Miller v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75, 77 (Okla. 1981) (“A will is a declaration of 
what a person desires to be done after death.  It is revocable during one’s lifetime, inoperative until 
death, and applicable to the situation that exists at the time of death.” (footnote omitted)). 
 84. See, e.g., id. (stating that “an instrument may be too defective to be entitled to probate but if 
it is testamentary in character it is a will”); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928, 930 (Okla. 
1954) (per curiam) (same); Loveren v. Eaton, 113 A. 206, 207 (N.H. 1921) (stating that a will is “the 
instrument by which [one] expresses his intentions as to the disposition of his property at his death” 
and further noting that where codicil is valid, it is “immaterial” whether earlier testamentary paper 
complied with formalities). 
 85. This approach is implicitly taken by courts refusing to apply will-construction statutes to a 
document not yet determined to be one.  See, e.g., In re Will of Smith, 528 A.2d 918, 922 (N.J. 
1987) (noting that the doctrine of probable intent is only available to interpret, not validate a will); 
see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 86. Miller, 637 P.2d at 77 (footnote omitted). 
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substitutes could be subject to a host of subsidiary will doctrines, such as 
revocation by divorce, ademption by satisfaction, and lapse.87 
3. Perception Variance 
Finally, will definitions differ over the nature and extent of their 
writer’s perspective on the content of the writings: any expression of 
testamentary desire, expression through a document that its maker 
intends as the actuating instrument,88 or expression through a document 
that its maker perceives as a “will.”89 
If testamentary intent equals the “intent to make a will,” and if these 
assorted permutations could leave one wondering what a will even is, 
then the same question holds true for testamentary intent.  Is a will a 
desire about dispositions or about documents?  Reifying the answer 
produces several potential options for what the will expresses: (1) the 
underlying desire merely evidenced by the document—the will is a 
desire; (2) the physical piece of paper expressing that desire—the will is 
a document; (3) a specific assemblage of the words written thereon—the 
                                                     
 87. But see Pepper v. Peacher, 742 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1987) (noting that while the argument 
that divorce revoked an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation under a retirement plan “possesses 
merit” given prior Oklahoma definition of a will, such definitions were contextually rejected as  
unacceptably stretching its meaning as applied to a revocation-upon-divorce statute).  Peacher did 
not, however, overrule any prior cases.  Therefore, it may be simply a matter of time before the 
broad definition is again invoked under slightly different facts. 
 88. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Wiggins, 2 So. 2d 402, 403 (Ala. 1941) (noting that animus testandi 
must exist at execution and must apply to the particular instrument proffered as the will); In re Estate 
of Kimble, 871 P.2d 22, 25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that while testamentary intent does not 
depend on its maker’s understanding of the legal effect of the document, it does require the intent 
that the very paper in question effects the disposition sought); In re Taylor’s Will, 17 S.E.2d 654, 
655 (N.C. 1941) (“The animus testandi required is more than an intent to execute a will.  It is the 
intent to presently devise by the paper writing being then executed and that such writing shall have 
the full force and effect of a will. . . . It must appear from the language used that it was the writer’s 
intent that the paper itself should operate as a disposition of her property to take effect after death.” 
(citations omitted)).  See also infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 89. Professor Page states that “[i]n some cases it has been said, in obiter, that the instrument is 
not a valid will unless the testator knows that it is, in the eyes of the law, a will and intends it to have 
this effect.”  1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 5.6.  He continues, however, by observing that the decisions 
do not seem to turn on the issue—yet recognizing its implicit hold where publication is required—
and concludes by agreeing that most courts do, however, require that the testator imbue the precise 
instrument with testamentary significance.  Id. 
Dicta or not, the distinctions may often be lost in translation, particularly where the term 
“testamentary intent” is conflated with “intent to make a will.”  See, e.g., In re Estate of Smith, 528 
A.2d 918, 922 (N.J. 1987) (“[T]he issue is not whether the writing probably expresses [the 
decedent’s] intention concerning the disposition of her estate if it were testamentary in character, but 
whether she intended that writing to be her will.”  (emphasis added)). 
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will is the part of the document that expresses desire.  While the three 
may usually coalesce, the issue is not academic.  For example, a 
jurisdiction could require an entirely handwritten holographic will or that 
signers placed their marks at the end of an attested will.  If statutory 
compliance proves testamentary intent, each instance invites exploration 
of what constitutes the actual “will” so as to permit it to meet these 
physically oriented requirements.  Inversely, if true testamentary intent 
always generates statutory compliance, one may view a putative 
testator’s arguable non-compliance as evidence that it wavers or possibly 
does not exist.90  As one’s very understanding of the definition of a will 
might effect inadvertent rule-breaking, the consequence of testamentary 
intent triples: testamentary intent holds stand-alone importance as half or 
more of the equation of a valid will and affects a finding of formality 
compliance—the other half or less—which itself creates presumptions 
about its existence. 
Few courts overtly struggle with the contours of testamentary intent, 
leaving much of the jurisprudential burden either on factual shoulders or 
negative implications—what testamentary intent is not, rather than what 
it is.91  Notwithstanding these difficulties, it essentially distills into two 
sub-components with the first more easily intuited than the second.  
Testamentary intent is the intent to (1) effect a deathtime disposition of 
property through (2) the specific document proffered.92  As explored in 
                                                     
 90. Such discussion suggests strict compliance review. 
 91. For example, testamentary intent is not: the present intent to make a present transfer; the 
present confirmation of a previous actual or perceived transfer, see, e.g., Barnes v. Viering, 206 A.2d 
112, 113 & n.1 (Conn. 1964) (letter suggested no need to make a will as letter recipient “knew” that 
property “really belong[ed] to [him]”); intent to make an irrevocable gift, see, e.g., Mallory v. 
Mallory, 862 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ky. 1993); past or future intent to convey, see, e.g., Boggess v. 
McGaughey, 207 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1948) (“There must be a contemporaneous intention thereby 
to create a revocable gift of property to take effect at death, and not merely to declare a purpose to 
make a gift in praesenti or . . . to speak of such action as already done . . . .”)); a guideline for an 
executor or attorney, see, e.g., Succession of Carroll, 30 So. 3d 11, 17–18 (La. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“‘[The document was] to be used only if legally necessary.  It [was] just a guideline if not 
necessary.’”); an inventory of assets, id.; or a will substitute. 
 92. Gulliver and Tilson note that “[d]ispositive effect should not be given to statements which 
were not intended to have that effect.”  Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 4.  The assertion leads to 
the view that no document reflecting testamentary intent should be effective as a will unless its 
creator imbued it with that level of significance.  The leading treatises agree, and case law generally 
follows suit.  See, e.g., GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS § 5.3 (1999) (“The testator must intend that the very instrument the testator executed 
will serve as the testator’s will; that is, the document that states the testamentary desires to be 
effective upon death.”); 1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 5.14 (“Most states have the rule that in order for an 
instrument to constitute a testamentary disposition, it must show the testator’s intention to make a 
testamentary gift by ‘that very instrument[] or paper itself . . . .’”).  See also Boggess, 207 S.W.2d at 
767 (characterizing as “indispensable” that at execution, the paper was designed to make a 
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Part III, the statement’s simplicity masks numerous subtleties, which 
may explain why testamentary intent seems less cogently developed than 
its import would warrant. 
B. Testamentary Intent Established 
The problem of whether a letter discloses testamentary intent is a 
difficult and elusive one and it is hard to reconcile all the cases or even 
to classify them.93 
It is remarkable that no single rule has emerged identifying the 
appropriate sources from which testamentary intent may be drawn, given 
its consequence to compliant and noncompliant documents alike.  While 
the cases evade precise categorization, three approaches emerge: (1) the 
proffered document itself must reflect it;94 (2) extrinsic evidence may 
establish it if the proffered document is ambiguous;95 and (3) extrinsic 
                                                                                                                       
testamentary disposition); Succession of Rhodes, 899 So. 2d 658, 660 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring 
that decedents have intended the very paper offered to be the will); In re Estate of Allen, 301 S.W.3d 
923, 928 (Tex. App. 2009) (“There must be evidence that the testator intended that the very 
document at issue be the instrument that actually makes the disposition of the testator’s property.”); 
Thompkins v. Randall, 150 S.E. 249, 251 (Va. 1929) (“Testamentary intent . . . means that the 
writing offered for probate must have been executed by the testator with the intent that such writing 
take effect as his last will.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g (1999) (“To be a will, the document must be executed by the decedent with 
testamentary intent, i.e., the decedent must intend the document to be a will or to become operative 
at the decedent’s death.”). 
 93. ATKINSON, supra note 69, at 210. 
 94. See, e.g., Barnes, 206 A.2d at 113–14 (determining that the will’s language must “in and of 
itself” express testamentary intent without the use of any extrinsic evidence); Mallory, 862 S.W.2d 
at 882 (reversing lower court rulings that handwritten, dated, and signed “by my hand” document 
found in Bible sufficiently expressed testamentary intent, in part by refusing to consider that 
decedent had told proponent “to look in the Bible” and that putative heirs had visited decedent 
perhaps twice in preceding decade); Succession of Carroll, 30 So. 3d at 17 (rejecting extrinsic, parol 
evidence to establish testamentary intent in asset inventory or attorney instructions); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 
448 S.E.2d 408, 409 (Va. 1994) (examining a signed and dated letter addressed to executor of prior 
will stating “I want my daughters to share 1/3, 1/3, 1/3” and finding it devoid of testamentary intent, 
which must be “determined by looking at the document itself,” notwithstanding decedent’s suicide 
attempt on same day of letter and success fifteen days later). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Estate of Webber, 551 P.2d 1339, 1341–43 (Idaho 1976) (admitting extrinsic 
evidence to discern whether testamentary intent existed within card bearing allegedly ambiguous 
statement “I bid this world goodbye[, and] I leave my land to you”); In re Estate of Duemeland, 528 
N.W.2d 369, 370–71 (N.D. 1995) (responding to contestant’s assertion that testator did not truly 
intend disinheriting effect of duly attested will, court noted that “[absent] ambiguity, extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible except to show fraud or mistake”); In re Estate of Moore, 277 A.2d 825, 
826–27 (Pa. 1971) (finding no testamentary intent in direction letter to attorney and noting that 
extrinsic evidence admissible on point only where “real doubt or real ambiguity” exists); In re Estate 
of Hendler, 316 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Tex. App. 2010) (permitting consideration of surrounding facts 
and circumstances if testamentary intent is unclear from instrument language). 
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evidence may establish it whether the proffered document is ambiguous 
or not.96 
The absence of a consistent rule is disappointing for the inattention 
to and devaluation of testamentary intent that it suggests.  It also hinders 
outcome prediction, particularly where choice-of-law issues arise or 
ancillary probate introduces another state’s law into core distributional 
matters.97  While property law historically reflects jurisdictional 
differences, these differences retard comprehensive theoretical analysis 
and encourage litigation.98  Cross-jurisdictional disagreement, though 
discouraging, may pale against the internal disarray manifest within a 
single jurisdiction, case, or court.  The simultaneously procedural and 
substantive gatekeeping role that ambiguity plays levies intense pressure 
against the expressive clarity of the document to the detriment of 
analyzing the decedent’s actual intent.  And any rule that impedes—
much less bars—a search for testamentary intent acts counterintuitively 
given its importance to the instant question, as well as to broader 
political, philosophical, and sociocultural theory.99 
Jurisdictions squarely rejecting extrinsic evidence of testamentary 
intent usually also require the document’s writer to intend the 
testamentary effect of the particular instrument itself, which functionally 
adds an additional but covert formality rule to the extant ones.100  This 
                                                     
 96. The Restatement view is that testamentary intent is a question of fact—thus not susceptible 
to summary judgment—and need not be shown from the face of the will, but can be inferred from 
the document or established by extrinsic evidence.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.1 cmt. g, 3.2 cmt. c (1999).  This forgiving approach, also 
adopted by the Uniform Probate Code in section 2-502, 8 U.L.A. 144, predominates when the 
question is statutorily resolved.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2(c) (West 2007) (substituting 
“writings intended as wills” for holographic wills); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-502(c) (2004) 
(allowing the establishment of testamentary intent by extrinsic evidence, “including, for holographic 
wills, portions . . . that are not in the testator’s handwriting”); In re Estate of Serbousek, 751 N.W.2d 
718, 722 (S.D. 2008) (reversing and remanding on grounds that lower court failed to consider 
extrinsic evidence bearing upon decedent’s intent in handwriting note and placing it in her pillow). 
 97. Cf. In re Last Will & Testament of Palecki, 920 A.2d 413, 421–27 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding 
that although decedent resided in a harmless-error jurisdiction when executing her alleged unsigned 
codicil to a valid holographic will, her domicile at death, notwithstanding choice-of-law rules 
promoting testate succession, could not effectuate the document consistent with internal rules); 
Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 
ALB. L. REV. 891, 895 (1992) (noting that in addition to unjust results, non-uniformity may generate 
“confusion and distrust among a very mobile lay populace”). 
 98. While interjurisdictional differences might encourage critique given competing views and 
theories from which to draw, the difficulty would be separating “pervasive objective policy” from 
“mere subjective result.”  Averill, supra note 97, at 911 (citing John T. Gombatz, Notes Toward a 
Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 542 (1977)). 
 99. See infra Part V.A. 
 100. See, e.g., Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Ark. 2004). 
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calls to mind the derided formalistic view that one really intends a will 
only upon complying with all formalities—creating a conclusive 
presumption of intent—or inversely, that failure to meet all formalities 
reveals that one did not truly intend a will—allowing a conclusive 
presumption of no intent.  The syllogism is flawed.  First, the only 
appropriately drawn “conclusion” is that a court may deny probate to a 
noncompliant document.  Second, recall that statutory compliance does 
not conclusively establish testamentary intent anyway.  It is telling to 
position this three-way split for admitting extrinsic evidence to prove 
testamentary intent against the single majority rule that accepts it to 
disprove the intent driving documents regular on their face.101 
Tautologically, determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to 
prove testamentary intent raises questions over both the appropriate 
distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” evidence and the 
definition of a “will.”102  Inter- and intra-jurisdictional difference on all 
scores hampers cognizability and permits the cynical supposition that 
determinations are fluid depending on the contextual framework, 
particularly where the same court or jurisdiction deploys alternate 
definitions or spins precedent in ways that harden or soften its edge.  For 
testamentary intent to retain or even expand its superiority within wills 
jurisprudence, then the law should cogently define and consistently seek 
it. 
C. Elusiveness Compounded: Coupling Definition and Proof  
The number of cases involving testamentary intent discourages 
systematic attempts to classify facts, laws, and outcomes.  That said, 
every appellate decision reveals at least one positional split fairly 
representative of those that propel litigation generally.  Three 
jurisdictions illustrate the disservice that definitional imprecision,  
                                                     
 101. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing compliance–intent interplay and 
the “sham will”). 
 102. For example, how broadly a will is defined may affect whether evidence of intent is 
intrinsic or extrinsic thereto.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Foxley, 575 N.W.2d 150, 152–55 (Neb. 1998) 
(reversing two lower court opinions that considered typed portions of a purported holographic will to 
establish the requisite intent); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(c) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 
145 (1998) (providing that typed portions may establish intent of holographic wills).  A jurisdiction 
that only requires the material provisions or portions of a holographic will to be in the testator’s 
handwriting implicitly, at least for this purpose, defines the will as the entire paper itself rather than 
merely the handwritten words. 
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evidentiary disagreement, and their combined effects hold for 
testamentary intent. 
1. Oklahoma: Diffuse Definitions and Evidentiary Ambiguity 
Oklahoma law seems straightforward enough: a valid will is a 
written and statutorily compliant instrument that disposes of property on 
death and is both “ambulatory and revocable during the testator’s 
lifetime.”103  Things are less clear than they initially seem. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has often asserted its “commit[ment] 
to the rule that . . . ‘[w]here an instrument is tendered for probate as an 
holographic will, [testamentary intent] must be plainly apparent.’”104  
Ironically, the court itself fails to be either plain or apparent in its 
pronouncement by leaving unanswered whether that “plain appearance” 
may be discerned from extrinsic sources or must derive from the 
document under review. 
While an early Oklahoma case intimates that the intrinsic approach 
controls by requiring that the will’s provisions along with its identity be 
determined from the instrument itself,105 no statutory106 or case law has 
ever specifically so provided.  Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
elsewhere stated that “[i]n determining whether or not an instrument 
offered for probate constitutes a holographic will, the court will consider 
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution . . . to arrive 
at the true intent of the testator.”107  Casting the net so broadly—
irrespective of an initial finding of documentary ambiguity—arguably 
includes anything of relevance, such as the decedent’s relationship with 
putative beneficiaries and presumptive heirs, the decedent’s health and 
the presence of exigent circumstances in testamentary attempts, the 
decedent’s familiarity with appropriate will forms, the subsequent 
conduct and statements of the parties, and the delivery or retention of the 
subject writing. 
                                                     
 103. In re Estate of Worsham, 859 P.2d 1134, 1135–36 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993) (citing In re 
Estate of Baxter, 798 P.2d 644, 646 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990)). 
 104. Craig v. McVey, 195 P.2d 753, 754 (Okla. 1948) (quoting In re Young’s Estate, 219 P. 100, 
100 (Okla. 1923)); see also Hooker v. Barton, 284 P.2d 708, 708, 710 (Okla. 1955). 
 105. Day v. Williams, 85 P.2d 306, 308 (Okla. 1938). 
 106. Statutes that initially seem to resolve the issue turn out to be false leads.  See supra Part 
II.B.2. 
 107. In re Paull’s Estate, 254 P.2d 357, 361 (Okla. 1950). 
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In other testamentary contexts, Oklahoma courts have either candidly 
sidestepped identifying the sources from which intent may be drawn or 
explicitly required that certain evidence appear on the document’s 
face.108  Such tactics either communicate that extrinsic evidence is 
admissible absent specific contrary directive or assume that the “plainly 
apparent” rule provides sufficient clarity regarding primary testamentary 
intent.  Both interpretations are possible; neither is clear.  Moreover, the 
case law in Oklahoma exhibits the attendant difficulties when the law of 
more than one jurisdiction arguably applies.  Indeed, the existence of a 
conflicting choice-of-law question could create the latent ambiguity for 
which the admission of extrinsic evidence has traditionally been an 
appropriate corrective.109 
Case review reveals the predictive difficulty attending the intent 
inquiry, notwithstanding the court’s magnanimous but common rejection 
of the need for formality or technical words.110  The distinctions drawn 
will often turn less on the documentary language used than on the 
serendipity of discoverable evidence beyond the decedent’s control, such 
as the time lapse between the document’s creation and the decedent’s 
death or the writer’s statements to others about having made a will.  
Compare whether testamentary intent exists more clearly in the statement 
“[i]nasmuch as I do not have a will, I would like to make the following 
arrangements in the event of my death”111—itself acknowledging that its 
writer did not believe the letter to be a will—than in the following 
phrases where the documents were rejected: “when I die I want you to 
                                                     
 108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Severns, 650 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla. 1982) (requiring “strong and 
convincing language” on the will’s face that decedent’s will intentionally omitted children and 
rejecting extrinsic evidence where will is silent on point); Estate of Crump v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 
1096, 1098 (Okla. 1980) (“The pretermitted-heir statute superimposes itself upon the silent will . . . .  
The status once so created by force of law cannot be erased by parol.  The needed intent for the 
heir’s omission cannot come dehors the will from sources not testamentary in character.”  (footnote 
omitted)); In re Abrams’ Will, 77 P.2d 101, 103 (Okla. 1938) (“The omission of the date from the 
will cannot be supplied by [extrinsic] evidence . . . .”); Davis v. Davis, 207 P. 1065, 1066–67 (Okla. 
1922) (refusing to “express[] any opinion as to the admissibility of [extrinsic] evidence [regarding 
signatory intent]” but, notably, continued by broadly considering many factors to conclude that the 
proposed will lacked testamentary intent). 
 109. Cf. In re Estates of McLean, 231 P.3d 727, 732–33 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (Hanson, P.J., 
dissenting) (reiterating precedent that the law where a will is executed forms part of that will and 
challenging the majority’s prohibition of extrinsic evidence to establish disinheriting intent given 
contrary rule in state of testator’s domicile and will execution). 
 110. Foote v. Carter, 357 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Okla. 1960) (rejecting the employment of technical 
words as requisite to a valid holographic will). 
 111. In re Estate of Rigsby, 843 P.2d 856, 857 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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have what I leave”;112 “if I should die first I want you and your heirs to 
have what I have left”;113 “[s]hould anything happen to me that I should 
be incapable of handling my business or in case of death the contents of 
this box are to be turned over to [the named parties]”;114 and “To Whom 
it may Concern” followed by statement of decedent’s intent regarding the 
disposition of certain items and referring to a disposition to take effect 
after the maker’s death.115  Professors McGovern and Kurtz state that 
“cases of holographs where testamentary intent is doubtful are probably 
rarer than those in which a testator’s clear intent to devise property was 
frustrated because the jurisdiction did not recognize holographs.”116  The 
preceding samples reveal that similar problems can result even in a 
jurisdiction that does. 
A circumvolutory example that effectuates probable testamentary 
intent but at the expense of tortured primary and secondary intent 
analysis lies in the peculiar case of Johnson v. Johnson.117  The decedent, 
a lawyer, prepared a one-page, typed document clearly reflecting 
testamentary intent—at least insofar as the nature of the document—but 
completely lacking witnesses.118  He then appended a handwritten, dated, 
and signed “codicil,” which stated little more than that the will was 
complete.119  The court determined that although all writings appeared on 
the same page, the handwritten appendage constituted a distinctly valid 
holograph—a second will—that republished the earlier typed and invalid 
one by codicil.120 
                                                     
 112. Craig v. McVey, 195 P.2d 753, 754 (Okla. 1948) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To be 
fair, in refusing to accord testamentary intent to that language, the Craig court noted that (1) the 
letter was one of many letters written to the same proponent; (2) the letter was “similar in tone” to 
those written to other persons; (3) the purported testamentary portion was but a small piece of a 
longer casual writing principally focused on unrelated issues; (4) the quoted language could as easily 
reflect the writer’s present intent to effect a future will—non-testamentary intent—as her present 
intent to effect a present will—testamentary intent; (5) the decedent was familiar with testamentary 
terminology, having written an attested will some years before; and (6) in the eleven years between 
the letter’s post and its writer’s death, there was no evidence reflecting her belief that she had made a 
testamentary disposition thereby.  Id. at 754–55. 
 113. In re Estate of Young, 219 P. 100, 100 (Okla. 1923) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Hooker v. Barton, 284 P.2d 708, 709, 710 (Okla. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. In re Purcell’s Estate, 176 P.2d 986, 986, 987 (Okla. 1947) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 116. MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 7, § 4.4. 
 117. 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954) (per curiam). 
 118. Id. at 929, 930. 
 119. Id. at 929. 
 120. Id. at 932.  Had the handwriting been viewed as an extension of the invalid typed document 
rather than a new and separate valid instrument republishing or incorporating the invalid typed 
document, the will should have failed under either holographic or attestation requirements, as it was 
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A will that is invalid to begin with can never be republished; there 
can be no codicil without an original will.  The Johnson Court 
maneuvered those realities with a definitional two-step: “a will may be 
so defective, as here, that it is not entitled to probate but if testamentary 
in character it is a will, nonetheless.”121  Shocking as that statement may 
appear, it remains good law, and subsequent cases, some of which 
remain in force, continue to invoke the precedent.122 
Thus, even where judicial pronouncement on the issue of 
testamentary intent and its proof superficially seems direct and 
expansive, the questions permit no easy answers given the tensions 
between what courts say, what courts mean, and what courts actually do. 
2. Arkansas: Definitional and Evidentiary Indecision 
The Arkansas experience aptly illustrates the discord inspired by the 
interplay between ambiguous definitions of a “will,” the search for 
testamentary intent, and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.  In 
Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, the decedent handwrote, signed, and 
dated an instrument titled “Last Will,” which listed all of her children 
and inserted specific property items under each child’s name.123  The 
document, fortuitously found in an upholstery roll a year after the 
decedent’s death, left most of the estate to her youngest child who had 
lived next door and had provided assistance throughout the decedent’s 
life.124  Along with arguably meeting jurisdictional requirements for a 
valid holograph, the instrument had been witnessed by two of the 
decedent’s acquaintances.125  At trial on the admission of the putative 
will, both witnesses testified that they had signed the document after the 
decedent had asked them for a favor and then produced the subject 
instrument.126  Additionally, the decedent’s sister testified that the 
decedent had told her that she had a will.127 
                                                                                                                       
neither “entirely in the handwriting of the decedent” nor properly witnessed.  See id. at 935–36 
(Halley, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 930 (per curiam). 
 122. See, e.g., Pepper v. Peacher, 742 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1987). 
 123. 189 S.W.3d 427, 428–29 (Ark. 2004). 
 124. Id. at 428. 
 125. Id. at 428–29. 
 126. Id. at 429. 
 127. Id. 
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The trial court refused to admit the instrument to probate as the 
decedent’s will on the grounds that there was “‘no testamentary 
language whatsoever within the instrument.’”128  On appeal, the 
reviewing court reversed course.129  After recognizing “long-standing” 
precedent finding testamentary intent crucial, the appellate court 
concluded that property-dispositive words “of a testamentary nature” 
were not required by applicable precedent and held that the decedent’s 
testamentary intent was clear.130 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reinstated the trial court’s order 
because it had not “clearly erred.”131  The court concentrated on 
evidentiary matters.  It reiterated its conviction that “[a] will is a 
disposition of property.”132  It affirmed that testamentary intent is “the 
intention to dispose of” property at death133 and must be unmistakably 
found by looking to and not beyond the document’s face.134  Strikingly, 
the court acknowledged binding precedent that where the existence of 
testamentary intent was in doubt, “‘inquiry may be made into all relevant 
circumstances.’”135  The court equivocated, however, by explaining that 
the rule applied only where “some” testamentary intent “[could] be 
inferred from the four corners of the document itself.”136  Apparently 
continuing with attempts to mask the tell in the precedent it had just 
cited, the court immediately followed with an internally inconsistent 
syllogism: 
It is axiomatic that use of extrinsic evidence is appropriate only when 
the instrument contains some words expressing an intent to dispose of 
property; stated another way, it is inappropriate when the instrument 
expresses no such words of disposition.  That is so because the 
existence of testamentary intent is not a matter of inference; rather, it 
must be expressed so that no mistake is made as to the existence of that 
intention.137 
                                                     
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 432. 
 132. Id. at 430 (citing Faith v. Singleton, 692 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Ark. 1985); Clark v. Rutherford, 
298 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ark. 1957)). 
 133. Id. (citing Smith v. Nelson, 299 S.W. 2d 645, 646–47 (Ark. 1957)). 
 134. Id. (citing McDonald v. Petty, 559 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1997)). 
 135. Id. at 431 (quoting Chambers v. Younes, 399 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Ark. 1966)). 
 136. Id. (citing Faith, 692 S.W.2d at 242; McDonald, 559 S.W.2d at 2). 
 137. Id. (citations omitted) (citing David Terrell Faith Prophet Ministries v. Estate of Varnum, 
681 S.W.2d 310, 312–13 (Ark. 1984); McDonald, 559 S.W.2d at 2). 
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The court closed by quickly dispatching additional difficulties posed 
by an earlier opinion in which it stated that the document itself “along 
with all the attending circumstances” must overcome any extant doubts 
about testamentary intent:138 
[That case] failed to mention . . . that, when a document sets forth no 
words of a dispositive nature, it is defective on its face because it lacks 
the required intent to make a will, and extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to prove the necessary intent.  Thus, to the extent [it] 
conflicts with this ruling, it is hereby overruled.”139 
Only where a lower court can hold a document “utterly devoid” of 
the intent that the appellate court calls clear and where a supreme court 
can turn “permissible inferences” into a requirement for unmistakable 
facts, can a handwritten, signed, dated, and witnessed document 
captioned “Last Will” and tying specific pieces of property to specific 
persons fail to provide “some inference” of testamentary intent. 
3. Montana: Money, Power, and Evidentiary Litigation 
Contrast the preceding case, where testamentary intent seems facially 
clear on a witnessed document but succumbs to the court’s refusal to 
admit extrinsic evidence, with the next, where testamentary intent seems 
facially absent under circumstances where its writer would know better, 
but is located after broad evidentiary mandates that seem to invert 
definitional ones. 
Charles Kuralt was well-known for his CBS series On the Road.140  
In 1968, he met Pat Shannon while on business; although he was then 
married, they began a close personal and financial relationship that lasted 
until his death some thirty years later.141  In the mid-1980s, Kuralt 
purchased adjacent parcels of property in Montana, the first covering 
                                                     
 138. Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (citing In re Estate of O’Donnell, 803 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1991)). 
 139. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Dunn v. Means, 803 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ark. 1991)).  The 
dissent chided the majority and reminded that the power to overrule precedent should be used only 
where adherence to precedent would result in “great injury or injustice.”  Id. at 433 (Dickey, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 149 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Ark. 2004)).  The 
internecine debate must have touched a nerve.  The majority parried in part with an equally 
procedural thrust: after noting that the Restatement (Third) of Property permits extrinsic evidence to 
establish testamentary intent, the court stated that “the idea to apply or adopt the Restatement comes 
from the fertile minds of the dissenters, not the parties.”  Id. at 432 n.3. 
 140. In re Estate of Kuralt (Kuralt I), 981 P.2d 771, 772 (Mont. 1999). 
 141. Id.  The “second family” relationship included substantial monthly economic support and 
payment for Shannon’s children’s graduate school tuition.  Id. at 773. 
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twenty acres and the second two parcels comprising ninety additional 
acres near the original acquisition.142  Kuralt and Shannon intended the 
property for eventual retirement use.143 
In May of 1989, Kuralt executed a valid holographic will stating, “In 
the event of my death, I bequeath to Patricia Elizabeth Shannon all my 
interest in land, buildings, furnishings and personal belongings [in the 
Montana property].”144  Five years later, however, he executed a formal 
will in favor of his spouse, Petie.145  It contained a standard revocation 
clause, devised all residential or vacation real property to his spouse, left 
the residue to his spouse and their children, and failed to name Shannon 
as a beneficiary.146  Petie was unaware of Kuralt’s relationship with 
Shannon until after he died,147 and Shannon was similarly unaware of 
Kuralt’s attested will.148 
In the spring of 1997, Kuralt deeded the original twenty-acre 
Montana parcel to Shannon, which, while structured as an arms’ length 
purchase and sale, was actually consummated through funds Kuralt had 
previously provided Shannon to accomplish that very end.149  Although 
Kuralt and Shannon were to meet the following fall to complete similar 
sham transactions over the remaining acreage, Kuralt fell ill in the 
interim.150  Writing from a New York hospital to which he had been 
admitted that very day, Kuralt handwrote, signed, and dated a short letter 
to Shannon expressing grave concern over his health and stating, “I’ll 
have the lawyer visit the hospital to be sure you inherit the rest of the 
place in MT.  [I]f it comes to that.”151  Kuralt sent the letter to Shannon, 
enclosing checks totaling $17,000.152  He died shortly thereafter without 
executing any subsequent will or codicil formalizing his intent.153 
Petie filed in New York to probate Kuralt’s Montana property; 
within the month, Shannon sought ancillary probate by alleging that 
Kuralt’s letter met formal requirements for a valid holographic will and 
                                                     
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 773–74. 
 147. Id. at 772–73. 
 148. Id. at 774. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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claiming entitlement to the remaining acreage of the subject Montana 
land.154  Kuralt’s estate sought summary judgment on grounds that the 
letter lacked testamentary intent by expressing, at most, a future intent to 
make a will.155  After hearing extrinsic evidence allegedly bearing on 
testamentary intent, the district court partially granted the estate’s 
motion.156  It held that the letter “clearly contemplates a separate 
testamentary instrument not yet in existence to accomplish the transfer of 
the Montana property.”157  In Kuralt I, the Montana Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded.158  Over a strong dissent filed by the Chief 
Justice,159 the court marshaled standard summary judgment principles to 
conclude that extrinsic evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact 
over testamentary intent.160  Interestingly, however, the court cast that 
question as whether Kuralt intended to give rather than sell the property 
to Shannon, rendering it but a short step to note that the gift’s timing 
could have been contemplated as to occur at death and thus reflect 
testamentary intent.161 
To the court, its holding avoided the need to reach the second issue 
framed on appeal: whether ambiguity as to a document’s intent was a 
prerequisite to the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove it.162  
Nevertheless, the court spent a good deal of energy on dicta so as to 
guide the proceedings on remand given that the parties had spent 
significant energy contesting the issue.163  Citing statute, the court noted 
that the legislature had not expressly deemed ambiguity as necessary 
for—or in qualification of a court’s discretion regarding—the admission  
 
                                                     
 154. Id. at 771–72. 
 155. Id. at 772. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 778. 
 159. The dissent objected on grounds that the letter “‘clearly contemplate[d] a separate 
testamentary instrument not yet in existence to accomplish the transfer of the Montana property.’”  
Id. at 778 (Turnage, C.J., dissenting).  This fell short of the statutory requirement that a document 
can only constitute the decedent’s will upon “clear and convincing evidence” that the decedent so 
intended.  Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2011)).  To the dissent, neither the record nor 
the letter met that standard.  Id.  According to the dissent, the letter merely reflected with precatory, 
non-imperative, and indirect language Kuralt’s intent to accomplish a will in the future rather than 
intend it, itself, to so serve.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 778. 
 161. Id. at 776 (majority opinion). 
 162. Id. at 776–77. 
 163. Id. 
GUZMAN FINAL 1/4/2012  8:08 AM 
2011] INTENTS AND PURPOSES 341 
of extrinsic evidence.164  The court continued by invoking what it 
characterized as a longstanding rule: 
All that is necessary to make an instrument testamentary is that it 
should show, when read in connection with surrounding facts and 
circumstances, a testamentary intention. . . . [I]f the intention of the 
testator is left in doubt by the form of expression used, then the 
intention must be arrived at by considering it in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, and the intention must clearly appear.165 
Although the court remonstrated that extrinsic evidence could never 
“manufacture testamentary intent” where such intent is “clearly absent” 
on the writing’s face, the court nevertheless excluded Kuralt’s letter from 
this narrow category given his history—gift-giving and otherwise—with 
Shannon, the exigency of the letter’s writing, and its use of the word 
“inherit” as attached to the Montana property.166  The court so found 
notwithstanding its nod to the necessity of present testamentary intent 
defined as “intent that the very letter constitute a valid holographic 
codicil to his Last Will.”167 
Although its preceding analysis intimated that (1) ambiguity was not 
necessary to the admission of extrinsic evidence,168 and (2) it did not see 
fit to rule on the issue in any event,169 the court closed with confusion: 
“Because Mr. Kuralt’s letter is unclear as to testamentary intent, the 
District Court properly admitted extrinsic evidence bearing upon Mr. 
Kuralt’s intent in the summary judgment proceeding.  The court should,  
 
                                                     
 164. Id. at 777; accord MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522(3) (2011) (“Intent that the document 
constitute the testator’s will may be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic 
wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator’s handwriting.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-
2-905(2), (3) (2011) (“This section does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under 
which [an agreement, including a will,] was made or to which it relates, as described in 1-4-
102 . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-102 (2011) (permitting the circumstances under which an 
instrument was made, including its situation and its affected parties, to be shown “so that the judge 
be placed in the position of those whose language he [or she] is to interpret”). 
 165. Kuralt I, 981 P.2d at 777 (majority opinion) (quoting In re Noyes’ Estate, 106 P. 355, 358 
(Mont. 1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. In re Estate of Ramirez, 869 P.2d 263, 265 
(Mont. 1994) (“Whether sufficient testamentary intent is present in an alleged will should be 
determined by first looking to the writing itself.  However, if the intent is not clear from the writing, 
then the surrounding circumstances may be considered.”  (citations omitted)).  Note that Ramirez 
appears to import an ambiguity prerequisite to the admission of the extrinsic evidence. 
 166. Kuralt I, 981 P.2d at 777–78. 
 167. Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 777. 
 169. Id. at 776–77. 
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therefore, also admit all [germane] extrinsic evidence . . . when the issue 
goes to trial.”170 
After remand, the trial court again reviewed Kuralt’s letter and 
found, after an abbreviated evidentiary hearing, that testamentary intent 
did exist.171  Appeal was distilled to whether the trial court erred in 
finding present testamentary intent and in refusing the parties an 
opportunity to be heard on the codicil status of the 1997 letter.172  With 
little discussion and no dissent, the court answered both questions in the 
negative and affirmed the lower court’s order and judgment.173 
The Estate of Charles Kuralt reached the Montana Supreme Court 
twice more: first on litigation over who held priority to serve as personal 
representative for the estate174 and next on litigation over whether the 
residuary estate left to Kuralt’s wife and daughters held the estate tax 
burden on the transfer of the Montana property.175  One wonders whether 
the disposition of Kuralt’s testamentary intent at trial could have avoided 
such serial litigation. 
These brief examples reveal the tautologies involved.  A 
jurisdiction’s definition of testamentary intent can affect the perceived 
clarity with which it is expressed and, in turn, the document’s 
ambiguous–unambiguous categorization for purposes of accessing 
extrinsic evidence.  Likewise, a jurisdiction’s answers to the evidentiary-
source question can affect the likelihood of a document’s proponent 
proving testamentary intent to begin with.  That both issues 
independently confront confusing, if not competing, inter- and intra-
jurisdictional treatment makes them even more difficult when joined.  
And these observations do not even begin to address some deeper 
structural difficulties that testamentary intent has raised. 
                                                     
 170. Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
 171. In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 933 (Mont. 2000). 
 172. Id. at 932. 
 173. Id. at 934.  First, the court rejected the estate’s contention that the trial court had 
erroneously supposed an “uninterrupted intent to transfer” the subject property, between Kuralt’s 
1989 and 1997 holographs, notwithstanding the intervening 1994 attested will.  Id. at 933–34.  
Reiterating the procedural posture of the case in which factual findings would not be disturbed 
unless clearly erroneous, the court characterized the Estate’s argument as one of fact and determined 
that the record disclosed sufficient evidence of Kuralt’s donative intent, impending death, and desire 
to conceal his relationship with Shannon to support the trial court’s holding.  Id. at 934. 
Second, the court rejected the Estate’s claim of trial court error in finding the 1997 letter to be 
a valid codicil to the attested will without offering the parties an opportunity to be heard.  Id.  To the 
court, the letter was a codicil as a matter of law.  Id. 
 174. In re Estate of Kuralt, 30 P.3d 345, 348–49 (Mont. 2001). 
 175. In re Estate of Kuralt, 68 P.3d 662, 663 (Mont. 2003). 
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IV. ELUSIVENESS EXPLAINED 
That which is common to both law and most psychologies includes 
various “inner states” such as thinking, feeling, wishing, deciding, and 
the like—and they are not easily explored. . . . In most psychologies 
such internal states comprise highly important data; in psychiatry they 
concern the central problems . . . . These data are relatively uncertain; 
they are discoverable only by indirection, and some of them, e.g., “the 
unconscious,” require very elaborate techniques to become known.176 
Intent is adjunct to action throughout law and turns accident into 
assault, manslaughter into murder, and, occasionally, casual instruments 
into a Last Will and Testament.  Acts are settled and past; they are 
capable of factual proof positive in a way that pure intent—like 
opinion—can rarely be.  Although less diffuse than free-floating thought, 
intent remains subjective and connotes that something will occur in the 
future.  It is a precursor to—rather than post hoc justification for—
conduct and resultant perceived and felt effect, whether relatively 
simultaneous or attenuated in time.  If intent itself is subjective, so too 
will be much of the evidence of its existence. 
The legal contours of intent thus can confound no matter the field—
“rather obscure” within criminal law,177 “not sufficiently nuanced” for 
torts.178  That said, what is it about intent that seems to heighten its 
difficulty when encountered in testamentary form?  A facile response 
would simply reiterate what Part III already addressed—the definition of 
the term, the divergence of approach over its proof, and the 
interconnection between the two.  Yet there is more beneath that surface.  
Testamentary intent is elusive because irrespective of its definition, it can 
be difficult for an individual even to form.  Relatedly, irrespective of the 
manner of its proof, it can be difficult for a court to identify that it was, 
in fact, formed.  The unique forward- and backward-looking context of a  
 
                                                     
 176. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 486 (1947). 
 177. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (4th ed. 2003).  Professor LaFave’s treatise 
reflects the jurisprudential difficulty through its attempt to articulate and sort the mental states of 
criminal intent, “state of mind,” scienter, or “mens rea.”  See generally id. §§ 5.1–.6 (reflecting the 
ambiguity in defining mental states). 
 178. Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 
1093 (2006) (“[Legal reform should] specify whether intention means purpose, knowledge, or both.  
Indeed, even the distinction between purpose and knowledge is not sufficiently nuanced.  There are 
more than two categories of legal ‘intention.’  Tort doctrine actually employs at least four categories 
and some subcategories . . . .”). 
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will’s execution and interpretation, respectively, exacerbate these 
difficulties. 
A. Individual Formation of Testamentary Intent 
Perhaps the inter vivos gift—which essentially requires donative 
intent, delivery, and acceptance179—provides the most appropriate analog 
for exploring the interplay between testamentary intent and testamentary 
act.  With gifts, law ratchets up intent by requiring present donative 
intent to effect a present transfer;180 intent formed today is insufficient if 
I plan to act on it tomorrow.  Physical delivery, which relinquishes 
dominion and control of the subject property, most clearly manifests this 
intent.181  As such, delivery both fulfills the second gift requirement and 
proves up the first.  Law closes the gift upon a donee’s acceptance.182 
Pure gifts are traditionally a zero-sum game.  Given the convention 
of possession as nine-tenths of the law, requiring intent plus delivery and 
acceptance ensures that all parties immediately appreciate at legal and 
practical levels exactly what has taken place.183  Donors who part with 
their property realize that they may no longer use, possess, control, 
transfer, enjoy, consume, destroy, or exclude others from it, and donees 
who accept delivery know that they will ordinarily gain that full measure 
of ownership with all of the rights and responsibilities thereby entailed.  
A donor may not revoke a completed gift.184  The erstwhile owner may 
regain title only through a subsequent reconveyance from the donee. 
Contrast the will.  Notwithstanding the casual view that it is simply a 
subset of a donative transfer that triggers at death rather than during life, 
the inter vivos construct does not so neatly square.  First, although pure 
testamentary and donative intent are both consideration-free, 
testamentary intent uniquely conditions itself upon some future, although 
unavoidable, event—death.  Therefore, one may always amend or revoke 
the intent whether already “acted upon” through a validly executed will 
or not.  Second, the act of executing the will supplants the delivery 
                                                     
 179. See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 872 (N.Y. 1986); RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE 
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 37 (2d ed. 1955). 
 180. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d at 872. 
 181. See id. at 874. 
 182. See id. at 874–75. 
 183. Id. at 874 (noting that the purpose of delivery is “to avoid mistakes by donors and 
fraudulent claims by donees”). 
 184. See id. at 872. 
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demanded for an inter vivos gift.  Like delivery, execution—particularly 
when highly ritualized—provides proof of intent.185  Unlike delivery, 
however, executing a will—a revocable document legally silent until 
death186—holds no immediate and final consequence for either the donor 
or the donee.  Obviously, no possession of the designated property shifts.  
Its owner continues with all ownership rights—including total 
consumption—until death. 
Thus, testators perceive and actually suffer zero diminution in 
property rights, and the difficulty with which most apprehend the loss of 
their property or their lives heightens a justifiable blitheness.187  
Reciprocally, beneficiaries neither perceive nor actually enjoy an iota of 
legal gain under an executed-but-not-yet-effective will, even in the 
unlikely event that they are aware of the precise person-to-property 
matches it holds.188  In sum, traditional sources will instruct that a 
putative beneficiary holds only the “expectancy,” which no matter how 
ill-defined, is currently no property interest at all.189  Assuming that they 
even arise, the convergent realizations that holding testamentary intent 
and acting upon it work no change to either the legal relationship of the 
parties or their practical or possessory relationship to the property 
preserves the mystery of the will.  If, in turn, individual and judicial 
understanding of the will remains obscure, testamentary intent is 
susceptible to being more indefinitely and ambiguously formed and 
expressed by expectant testators, ignored by expectant takers, and 
disregarded by courts. 
B. Judicial Identification of Individually Formed Testamentary Intent 
Although intent is elusive no matter the field, it is often more clearly 
formed or found outside of the testamentary context—or perhaps because 
                                                     
 185. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 34, at 492–93. 
 186. The one arena in which a will might have effect immediately upon execution is to revoke a 
prior document, especially where revival of prior wills is either not permitted or is contingent on 
clear proof of intent.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. a (1999). 
 187. McBride v. McBride, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 476, 484–85 (1875) (“[The] spirit of 
procrastination and delay in regard to the execution of last wills and testaments . . . so often springs 
from youth and health and the confidence in a long life.”). 
 188. In that title will not transfer—if ever—until death, beneficiaries need not accept upon 
execution.  Although presumed, acceptance is deferred until probate as mediated through 
assignment, release, or renunciation—the deathtime equivalents of refusing to accept a gift. 
 189. Katheleen R. Guzman, Releasing the Expectancy, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 775, 786 (2002). 
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its identification drives the assignment of civil or criminal liability with 
attendant shifts in the evidentiary burden, it is at least more amenable to 
identification and (dis)proof. 
1. Intent and Conduct Coincidence 
The cleanest perspective from which to assess the existence of intent 
occurs when it coincides with action, permitting observers to intuit 
confidently that the desire precipitated the conduct, which itself would 
not have occurred but for that desire.190  If so, intent is best formed, 
refined, and established through neither thoughts nor words, but deeds.  
As earlier discussed, gift law so instructs by requiring donors to feel the 
“wrench of delivery,”191 with donative intent unenforceable until the 
donor actually makes the play.  Moreover, such confluence of intent and 
conduct is even more clear in legal contexts where the intent-holder both 
appreciates and must at least partially internalize the effects of acting 
upon it, and must already have done so for the subject litigation to have 
been brought. 
Crimes and torts provide ready examples.  “Bad thoughts alone 
cannot constitute a crime”;192 there must be correlative criminal conduct 
linking actus reus with mens rea.193  Similarly, although irrelevant to 
negligence or strict liability, “intent by itself is never a tort.”194  
Intentional torts require some actionable conduct serious enough to 
                                                     
 190. A common maxim states that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable, or 
ordinary, consequences of his acts.  See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 
157 (1917). 
 191. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 34, at 504 (noting that the process of 
conveyance achieves the “wrench of delivery”). 
 192. LAFAVE, supra note 177, § 6.1.  The rule remains notwithstanding the medieval doctrine 
that voluntas repubtabitur pro facto, or the intention is to be taken for the deed.  Id. § 11.2 
(discussing the crime of attempt). 
 193. See George P. Fletcher, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and the Metamorphosis of 
Lloyd Weinreb, 90 YALE L.J. 319, 337 (1980) (referencing “the venerable maxim that a crime 
requires (1) an act, (2) an intent, and (3) the coincidence of the act and the intent at some moment in 
time”); cf. Marcel Frym, The Criminal Intent, 31 TEX. L. REV. 260, 261 (1953) (challenging the 
construct of criminal law, which is premised on “the time-honored assumptions that human actions 
presuppose formation of a conscious intent and that forming intent is exclusively a function of the 
human mind as a free agent”).  Professor Fletcher notes Sir Edward Coke’s observation: “‘Actus non 
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea [no act is criminal unless accompanied by a criminal intent].’”  Fletcher, 
supra, at 321 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 107 (1669)). 
 194. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (2000). Tortious intent exists when an actor “(1) 
has a purpose to accomplish [a] result or (2) lacks [the] purpose but knows to a substantial certainty 
that the . . . action will bring [it] about.”  Id. 
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support the claim.  Without conduct, intentional-tort liability or criminal 
prosecution would be a nonutilitarian nightmare, unfair to enforce, 
impossible to police, and lacking any deterrent benefit to offset the costs.  
Without intent, punishment could be futile, immoral, or worse.  The 
same cannot be said of the will.  That the law has already divorced intent 
from conduct for purposes of the will in all but the most rigidly strict of 
jurisdictions reveals that, unlike torts and crimes, their coupling is no 
longer viewed as indispensable to the enforceability of either. 
Intent and conduct can be mutually reinforcing.  With torts and 
crimes, the nature of the conduct and the harmful results it occasions 
often make the legal assignment of intent so clear—or at least 
transferrable from one intended result to another—that no room exists for 
rational doubt over its presence.195  To use a simplistic example, most 
people most of the time would presumably feel comfortable assuming 
that A would neither raise toward nor let fall a claw-backed hammer 
upon B’s head without intending, or at least being recklessly indifferent 
to, a specific, serious result.  Most courts would be similarly confident in 
the rectitude of ensuing criminal conviction or civil liability, or at least 
safe in knowing that heightened proof burdens will cover the instances 
where intent is questionable.  Criminal and tortious conduct are things 
that the average person can generally see and recognize for what they are 
and the intent they may reflect.  A potential actor probably appreciates 
the sorts of acts that constitute crimes or intentional torts.  So he either 
does not intend them and thus does not so act, or he does intend them and 
thus acts—but hopes not to be caught.  The same cannot be said within 
wills law, where intent and statutorily compliant conduct are more fluid 
and less intuitive.  Moreover, the conduct from which intent could be 
extrapolated might be much more commonplace outside of the legal 
realm than a hammer attack on a third party: like a letter written to a 
relative, a day’s entry into a diary, or a note to an attorney. 
The lessened difficulty that intent poses to contract formation and 
breach supports similar analysis, not because assumptions and outcomes 
                                                     
 195. The theoretical underpinnings for res ipsa loquitur—the thing speaks for itself—although 
traditionally limited to negligence, are analogous.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D 
& cmt. j (1965). 
The doctrine does find some application within criminal law, under which an act constitutes the 
crime of attempt when it can have no other reasonable purpose than the commission of the intended 
crime.  LAFAVE, supra note 177, § 11.4(d).  Although accepted by some courts and legislatures, this 
so-called “equivocality approach” has not found much favor with scholars.  Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. 
PA. L. REV. 299, 325 (1996). 
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render intent easy to locate, but rather because it is no longer needed at 
all.  Modern contract theory sidesteps many intent-associated difficulties 
by replacing the older subjective, individual intent-based approach196 
with the “objective theory” of assent whereby conduct controls.  Judge 
Learned Hand insisted: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties.  A contract is an obligation attached by 
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.  If, 
however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he 
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning [that] 
the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were 
mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.197 
As such, a party’s intent to be contractually bound is largely irrelevant; it 
is the act and what it objectively, reasonably manifests that supplies the 
legal result, rather than an intent as furthered, established, or proved by 
that act.198  The sham-will cases illustrate that similar act–intent 
decoupling has not occurred within the testamentary realm.199 
Even absent incontestable evidence of contract law’s traditional 
offer, acceptance, and consideration trio200 through expressly manifested 
intent, reasonable reliance (itself a close variant of both conduct and 
intent) can either form the consideration necessary for a putative contract 
or sustain an independent theory of recovery.201  Moreover, courses of 
dealing and performance provide evidence through conduct and can  
 
                                                     
 196. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d ed. 2004) 
(comparing subjective and objective theories and noting the universal acceptance of the objective 
theory today). 
 197. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d sub nom. 
Ernst v. Mechs. & Metals Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City 
Bank of N.Y. v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913), quoted in 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 196, § 3.6. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See supra Part III.C. 
 200. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 190 (4th ed. 2004) 
(describing offer, acceptance, and consideration requirements).  While the Statute of Frauds 
promotes a particular sort of conduct when demanding that certain contracts be written, massive 
exceptions exist through part performance and equitable estoppel.  See generally 2 FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 196, §§ 6.9, 6.12 (discussing part performance and reliance with respect to the Statute of 
Frauds).  Both theories recognize that at least some conduct—through performance or reliance—
supporting at least some demonstrable intent or evidencing the underlying agreement, will have 
occurred.  See id. 
 201. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 196, § 2.19 (describing reliance as an independent grounds 
for recovery). 
GUZMAN FINAL 1/4/2012  8:08 AM 
2011] INTENTS AND PURPOSES 349 
reliably demonstrate the existence and boundaries of parties’ intent to be 
bound. 
Although interpretive difficulty over intent generally eases when it 
coincides with conduct and performance with presumably immediate 
consequences for the actor and other implicated parties, such easing 
might infrequently occur within the category of testamentary intent given 
its appreciably intrinsic attenuation of intent, conduct, and outcome.  
This analysis—act and effect instigating or proving intent and vice 
versa—begs a related question: assuming a would-be testator’s clear 
understanding of testamentary intent, what correlative action completes 
it?  Execution of the will itself?  The later death of its testator with that 
will intact?  Neither answer is trouble-free when seeking reliable 
indicators of intent. 
An initial question exists regarding the definition and timing of the 
intent and the conduct.  As legally marked, testamentary intent occurs at 
execution with the commensurate and simultaneous conduct combining 
to create an acceptable document.202  More abstractly, however, as the 
will speaks only at death and not before, the actual fulfillment or 
performance of either the intent or act component could shift to the point 
at which the decedent dies leaving a previously executed will intact.  
Additionally, wills have no shelf life.  Significant time can elapse 
between formation of testamentary intent and execution, execution and 
death, or formation of testamentary intent and death.  While a will 
executed a day before death more convincingly secures the recency and 
primacy of the testator’s stated desires matched to extant circumstances, 
it is no more valid than one executed decades before.  A longer gap 
between the expression of arguable testamentary intent and death—when 
testamentary intent becomes relevant—increases the possibility that 
memories will fade, witnesses will die, and already-fragile evidence will 
weaken in turn. 
Contrast, for example, a typical sale of goods, where intent is formed 
and performance, through payment, transfer, and acceptance, occurs in 
close temporal proximity.  Although contracts are bilateral, wills are not.  
                                                     
 202. Testamentary intent must exist at a will’s execution.  See, e.g., Fleming v. Morrison, 72 
N.E. 499, 500 (Mass. 1904) (noting that the “animus testandi” must exist when the will is signed or 
acknowledged).  Note the slight difference in the following formulations: (1) present intent to 
transfer either a present or future interest can support a gift, and (2) present intent to transfer a 
present or future interest in the future is a will.  The two can be hard to distinguish, particularly 
where the donor retains a life estate in the subject property or conditions its transfer upon death.  See, 
e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1986). 
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As there is no such thing as the legal “performance” of a will, time 
deadlines are nonexistent, much less “of the essence.”  Even from the 
abstract perspective of performance as equaling “death without 
revocation,” it would still be impossible to discern when that 
“performance” will occur.203 
2. Intent, Conduct, and Relevant Actors 
The remaining evidentiary difficulties in establishing testamentary 
intent are already well-known.  Dead men tell no tales, but living ones 
do; for crimes and torts, confessions or admissions might be the norm.  
Even when an alleged criminal refuses to testify or a tortfeasor withholds 
direct contemporaneous or subsequent evidence of culpable intent, she 
may be available for direct or cross-examination and attendant credibility 
assessment through observable conduct, facts, and the inferences or 
presumptions they yield.204  Again, contracts are analogous.  As 
enforceable ones require both offer and acceptance, as well as 
consideration on both sides,205 there will always be at least two parties 
bearing a relevant intent with which to color the analysis or inform the 
result.  Moreover, as contracts are formed between the living, there is no 
contextual determinant that one party must die by the time that litigation 
will arise. 
A testator could die a day or a decade after executing a will.  
Irrespective of the temporal brevity between testamentary intent, will 
execution, and testator death, the very question over whether 
testamentary intent exists does not surface until probate, after the death 
of the sole party to have known with conviction whether it had been 
formed.206  The inability to question a decedent over intent makes its 
                                                     
 203. A will written in anticipation of suicide would be the only plausible scenario. 
 204. Moreover, while there are dead convicted criminals, there are no dead criminal defendants.  
Consider Enron founder Kenneth Lay’s death: post-conviction, pre-appeal on conspiracy and fraud 
charges for “vaporiz[ing] more than 4,000 jobs and billions of dollars in stockholders’ investments.”  
Thomas S. Mulligan & Miguel Bustillo, Death Puts Lay Conviction in Doubt, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 
2006, at A1.  The rule of abatement generally instructs that a criminal case is dismissed or vacated if 
the defendant dies without exhausting appeals.  Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 482–83 
(1971) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per 
curiam); 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.4 (3d ed. 2008). 
 205. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 200, at 190. 
 206. Ante-mortem probate, where a testator can testify to her own intent, is a rare exception.  See 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-01 
(West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West 2005). 
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certainty tricky, invites interested parties to misremember or manufacture 
self-serving evidence, and removes impediments to factfinder bias in 
interposing their own intents or preferred modes of its expression. 
C. Elusiveness Re-Compounded 
If acts can instigate the formation of intent or clarify its subsequent 
proof and vice-versa, then the reliability of both is inversely 
proportionate to their temporal and effective separation from the severity 
of their consequences.  Actors divorced from the immediate legal or felt 
effects of their action are less likely to internalize costs or minimize 
ambiguity.  Neither putative, living testators nor actual, deceased ones 
personally suffer the effects of their own action, improvident or 
otherwise.  Unlike the typical criminal, tortfeasor, contracting party, or 
even inter vivos donor, who, in living with the outcome of her choices, 
will presumably consider and act on intent in more deliberate ways, the 
pre-death conduct of testators regarding both their promises and their 
property most always externalizes its human or economic costs on heirs 
or beneficiaries, neither of whom are likely to hold much justifiable 
reliance on a particular outcome of that decedent’s estate.  For example, 
consider Charles Kuralt, who might have done things differently had he 
been there to witness five years of litigation between his wife and 
daughters and his mistress.207 
As with Part III’s discussion of the basics of testamentary intent 
doctrine itself, understanding exactly why it is elusive is equally 
frustrating.  That circles seem to close in on themselves could leave 
courts or commentators more confounded than before.  If so, indistinct 
rules and outcomes will remain, with doctrinal reformation viewed as a 
game not worth the candle. 
V. REFORMING TESTAMENTARY INTENT: WHY AND HOW 
A. Why Reforming Testamentary Intent Matters 
Overlooking legal convolution can generate aberrational outcomes; 
ignoring it once discerned fares little better no matter the trials or 
tribulation that a closer look prompts.  When a court imposes 
unconsidered doctrine on easy cases where the end result would not have 
                                                     
 207. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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differed anyway, one may easily ignore, or correct on appeal, design and 
application flaws.  But when imposed on—or made for—harder cases, it 
may well inflict downstream costs on the parties, future litigants, the 
judicial system, and the societal values that system preserves and 
promotes.  Most poignantly, it may adversely affect the realization of a 
particular decedent’s last wishes and the testamentary freedom animated 
thereby. 
The need for attention to testamentary intent has become even more 
acute over the past two decades, given the increasing recognition of its 
role in overcoming execution defects.208  As “formalism falls, intent 
rises”; as intent rises, heightened care must be afforded to its contours.209  
Nowhere is this need more vivid than in jurisdictions adopting or 
influenced by the Restatement (Third) of Property and the Uniform 
Probate Code, which come closest to raising intent to a document-
determinative position.210  But intent’s intense pressure will continue—
and from expanded quarters—given trend lines in liberalized rule–
standard interplay and the inexorable march of technological advance.211 
1. Costs and Inefficiencies 
Imprecision works its demerits at every participation level within the 
legal system, and the indistinct and unsound rules governing 
testamentary intent are no exception.  First, these rules increase 
transactional burdens on the hopeful testator, who must take greater care 
to ensure that the subject document comports and reflects intent readily 
and clearly.  From a least-cost-avoider perspective, this might seem 
optimal.  That is, any marginal increase in the cost of expressive 
obligation—handily discharged through such words as “I intend this 
document to be my will”—is easily outweighed by the benefits in 
securing intent and avoiding the negative consequences of its 
                                                     
 208. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II prefatory note (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 75 (1998). 
 209. See supra Part II; see also Lindgren, Formalism, supra note 9, at 1010, 1017–20 (discussing 
assorted components of testamentary intent). 
 210. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 211. Who knows how far and fast such things as videowills, videoconferencing, flash drives, 
email, disks, electronic signatures, and Skype will go in entering discussion over documents, 
signatures, presence, and testamentary intent.  The questions are not new, but in a way, are just 
beginning.  See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509 
(1992) (discussing the role of new technologies in the legal system); Grant, supra note 12 
(advocating acceptance of electronic technology in the law of wills). 
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imprecision.212  But notably, nebulous intent more likely affects the 
holographic will and, thus, testators who are less educated, with less 
testamentary acumen, less wealth, and less inclination or ability to visit 
lawyers.  The effects of unclear, or clear but strict, intent rules on such a 
vulnerable population with less access to estate planning increases their 
unfairness.  Moreover, that fewer dollars are actually at stake minimizes 
the downsides of broadening testamentary effect to cover more casual 
documents drafted by such parties. 
Second, the current rules adversely affect particular would-be 
beneficiaries or heirs by forcing initial or appellate litigation over 
questions of intent, particularly in that highly probabilistic determination 
is low, given the parties’ incomplete information over clear legal rules or 
litigation outcomes.213  For documents accepted into probate, heirs or 
prior beneficiaries may challenge close questions of testamentary 
intent;214 current beneficiaries may respond in kind.  Although both 
players would presumably handicap the reward discounted by time, cost, 
and risk, litigation—especially involving subjective, fact-intensive issues 
coupled with imprecise rules—is not cheap, particularly for the risk-
averse.215  Windfall is possible for both. 
Litigation depletes the resources of winners, losers, and the contested 
estate.216  Even a successful malpractice suit would effectively increase 
                                                     
 212. Thus, an ounce of T’s prevention would be worth the pound of B’s cure.  Moreover, to the 
extent that a testator intentionally generates ambiguity, a possibility suggested by the sham-will 
cases, the costs imposed on T would be particularly deserved. 
 213. For straightforward discussion of decision analysis accessible even to the uninitiated, see 
HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 1–33 (2003). 
 214. Less benign motivators exist.  See Ted Sichelman, Why Barring Settlement Bars Legitimate 
Suits: A Reply to Rosenberg and Shavell, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 & n.1 (2008) 
(identifying motivators such as extraction of “nuisance-value settlements,” expectation of judicial 
error, possible spoliation of evidence or perjury, error in counter-party’s estimation of success). 
 215. Aside from a basic comparison of projected payoff to costs of reaching it, also relevant may 
be the worth of that payoff over the total estate.  The higher both the projection and the ratio, the 
more likely the litigation.  For example, compare a putative holograph simply bequeathing “the 
Klimt painting” with one transferring the entire estate. 
 216. Barring a fee-shifting statute, litigants generally bear their own costs rather than losers 
paying all.  See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 214, at 58–59 & n.4 (discussing fee-shifting as an effort 
to combat frivolous litigation); see also John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043–
44 (1994) [hereinafter Langbein, Will Contests] (reviewing DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE 
INFLUENCED: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)) (positing that this 
feature along with jury trial, unavailability of ante-mortem probate or anticipatory relief, and probate 
staffing, contributes to the higher incidence of will contests in the United States relative to other 
jurisdictions). 
The estate typically subsidizes costs of the will defense and possibly also the costs of good-
faith claims, proponents of wills, putative will beneficiaries, prevailing contestants, and contest 
attorneys.  80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 959 (2002).  Of course, actual takers actually bear these costs. 
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the price of competent estate planning for a choir in no need of a 
sermon.217 
Economics and efficiency, however, are not the sole litigation 
determinants.  Although net benefits may predominate in a true 
commercial setting between arms-length transactors, the probate context 
reflects and begets powerful emotions that can override economically 
rational decision-making.  Sometimes a proponent consciously supports 
a will to uphold the perceived last wishes of a loved one, and sometimes, 
a challenger subconsciously resists a will to convince herself that she 
was truly loved.218  “‘When I bring up the issue of inheritance with my 
mother, then, I am asking her not to abandon me to wanton circumstance, 
to mother me from the grave.  It is a fantasy of absolute safekeeping I am 
requesting, one that will cradle me from life’s indignities.’”219 
Third, whether eventually settled or not, indeterminate outcomes 
extract concomitant burdens on judicial economy.  Consider the number 
of cases involving testamentary intent filed over the last two decades 
alone.220  More coherent doctrine would provide more sophisticated cost–
benefit information to the parties and decreased litigation overall, and 
increase the likelihood that the remaining cases warrant judicial 
involvement.  If the current legal structure of testamentary intent is so 
costly, one corrective would be to return to bright-line rules for attested 
wills and reject both holographic and nuncupative ones.  In most 
jurisdictions, that ship has already sailed; moreover, past formalism did 
                                                     
 217. Those who seek attorneys for will drafting will not normally be “the nebulous testator.” 
 218. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests: An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 607, 613, 617 (1987) (examining one county’s probate records over a nine-year period and 
concluding that there was “no correlation between size of the estate and the likelihood of contest,” 
but that in some cases, the motivation to challenge “derived from nonpecuniary impulses”). 
Similar reasons might discourage a vigorous defense to a will contest: 
[T]he odor of the strike suit hangs heavily over this field.  The beneficiaries named in the 
will are likely to be either charitable organizations whom the testator preferred to his 
relatives, or else those of his relatives and friends whom he loved most and who are most 
likely to want to spare his reputation from a capacity suit. 
John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 (1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
 219. Judith G. McMullen, Keeping Peace in the Family While You Are Resting in Peace: Making 
Sense of and Preventing Will Contests, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 61, 81 (2006) (quoting Daphne 
Merkin, Mother of All Surrogates, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 6, at 74).  Professor McMullen 
continues: “‘[M]oney, she says, is never about money.  It’s about other things . . . [u]sually anger 
and guilt.’”  Id. at 80–81 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bob Morris, Stop Spending My 
Inheritance, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 9, at 3). 
 220. In many cases, testamentary intent is at issue in either its operational or interpretive sense. 
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nothing to stanch the litigational tide it itself created.221  More 
substantively, merely retrenching strict intent doctrine and the rules for 
its expression is simplistic and dissatisfying if one admits the 
preeminence of intent and the freedoms it ensures. 
2. Actualizing Intent Through Testamentary Freedom 
a. Decedent Wishes 
Property is commonly defined as a series of divisible rights relatively 
ordered among owners and things.222  Those rights, including transfer, 
can be variously stratified.  For example, title can shift voluntarily or 
involuntarily, for consideration or without, and between the living or at 
the donor’s death.  The voluntary-transfer right is valuable irrespective of 
consideration.  Sellers capitalize through dollars earned or costs 
foregone.  Donors secure tax efficiencies, leverage, moral capital and 
bargaining power,223 ease of mind in providing for a necessitous 
beneficiary, and the purely altruistic pleasure of having made a gift, 
anonymously or otherwise.  Giving self-actualizes.  If donors did not 
benefit, gifts would not be made. 
As a death-deferred gift, wills temper some of these values but 
strengthen others, perhaps because they are partially realized upon a 
will’s execution as well as its probate.  Writing a will is an intensely 
personal act, requiring its executor to confront simultaneously three 
interrelated issues, each difficult enough alone: economic position, 
interpersonal relationship, and mortality.224  By encouraging saving over 
spending, recognition of the will preserves economic stability for 
testators, beneficiaries, and the society within which they live.225  But 
                                                     
 221. See, e.g., In re Abram’s Will, 77 P.2d 101, 103 (Okla. 1938) (lamenting the defeat of the 
testator’s clear testamentary intent by her failure to meet statutory requirements). 
 222. See generally J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
711 (1996) (discussing conceptualization of property). 
 223. Donors can secure general status through gifts and patronage or, more individually, affect 
others’ behavior through promise of a future gift or reminder of a past one.  See generally Paul W. 
Tappan, The Sociology of Inheritance, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 54 (Edmond N. 
Cahn ed., 1948). 
 224. See, e.g., John Astrachan, Why People Don’t Make Wills, 118 TR. & EST., Apr. 1979, at 45 
(providing a psychiatrist’s view to explain high percentages of intestate death). 
 225. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes 
and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 16 n.67 (1995) (noting savings disincentive of bequest taxes 
on transferors).  Because tax rates never reach 100%, the savings disincentive would skyrocket were 
there no mechanism through which to transfer the property at all. 
GUZMAN FINAL 1/4/2012  8:08 AM 
356 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
more personally, it might protect autonomy even more than through the 
decision-making power illustrated through a routine gift. 
Inter vivos gifts typically mark a holiday or an important occasion 
over the arc of the recipient’s life—birthday, graduation, marriage, 
anniversary, retirement.  Although the sentimentality of the property 
given presumably increases with the significance of the commemorated 
event, the property forming the gift is often highly fungible, as with 
money or a gift card, or newly purchased, with neither preexisting 
connection to the donor nor intent for retention or use save its relatively 
immediate transfer to the donee.  The donee may be a close friend or a 
virtual stranger.  Unless the gift was motivated by donee need rather than 
donor largesse, post-gift assessment of its recipient’s economic position 
is normally irrelevant to the donor and, where it is, can be factored into 
future donative transfers to secure the donee’s continued well-being. 
Testamentary gifts stand in stark contrast.  “Although some 
testamentary instruments contain broad and generic distributive clauses, 
many testators instead specifically match devises with devisees, 
rendering both the res and the entitlement to its testamentary transfer 
‘personal.’”226  The subject property is normally not purchased with a 
view to transferring it away, but is already owned by the testator and may 
hold personal and sentimental value quite distinct from traditional 
economic worth.  More than a neighbor or colleague or the child of the 
same, the beneficiary of a deathtime gift is usually the testator’s own 
spouse or child, parent or sibling, or the functional equivalent of a close 
partner or friend, irrespective of need- or blood-based criteria.  The 
triggering event happens to the donor, not the donee, and is not a 
celebratory event.  It is death, and it results in the last, and thus, 
unadjustable expression of intent that the decedent will ever make.  If 
writing a will is person- and family-constitutive, the only intent that 
should matter for both process and result is the decedent’s.  That others 
could hold a different intent or express it alternatively should be 
irrelevant.  First, there is a human inclination to think “I would have 
done that differently” or even “I would not have done that at all” when 
considering another’s intent or action.  Disposition toward such critique 
is probably greater where, as here, the context is universal and contains 
such fundamental elements as property, family, life, and death.  When all 
parties are alive as through inter vivos transfer, sharing that critical 
                                                     
 226. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 657 (2000). 
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sentiment with another might be well-received or not.  Influence aside, 
the choice over whether to move forward from intent on through conduct 
will remain with the actor.  When the actor, however, has already died, 
“sharing that sentiment” moves from observation into actual power: a 
challenger’s contest, a bench or jury determination that no testamentary 
intent exists, and in a context where the testator is unavailable to clarify, 
correct misimpression, or responsively change course.227 
In consequence, testamentary intent—imprecise, difficult to 
establish, emotionally fraught—becomes even more malleable, subject 
either to an innocently transferred factfinder impression over what they 
would have, thus what the decedent “must have,” wanted, or more rawly, 
what the decedent “should have wanted” even if he did not.228  This 
potential invites speculation over whether a given holding might reflect 
the result orientation, and thus intent, of those decision makers more than 
the actual desires of the decedent,229 and it renders the jurisdiction’s 
intestacy scheme critical if the outcome is to set aside a document as no 
will at all.230  Ambiguity factored by indeterminacy also worsens 
                                                     
 227. An exception could exist in unlikely examples, such as a holographic letter’s recipient 
requesting the testator to formalize things through a validly attested will. 
 228. See, e.g., Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 216, at 2043 (“Our fundamental value in the 
law of wills is freedom of testation, but the inner tendencies of civil jury trial put our procedural 
system in conflict with our substantive law. . . . [B]ecause jurors who decide without giving reasons 
have such latitude to substitute their wishes for the testator’s.”). 
 229. Scholarship on will contests that studies the reversal rate of jury determinations on appeal 
illuminates.  See Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 545–46 (noting an early Minnesota study of testamentary undue influence 
cases finding that jury verdicts were up to six times more likely to be reversed than those rendered 
by the trial judge); Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 92 nn.4–5 (1953) (noting that 
although the jury in California found for the contestant in 77% of will contests filed between 1892 
and 1953, 62% of those verdicts were reversed by the Supreme Court of California).  Critique could 
be levied against the judiciary as well, if the rule of law is endemically value-laden in application.  
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional 
Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing formalism and value choices in 
constitutional adjudication). 
For scholarship discussing bias in results, see Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal 
Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411 
(2009); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236–37 
(1996); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 SMU L. REV. 1783 (2009); 
E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian 
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1999). 
 230. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
199, 228–33 (2001) [hereinafter Foster, Paradigm] (discussing efforts to redefine family to improve 
inheritance process); Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes Over Dead Bodies, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008) [hereinafter Foster, Individualized Justice] (discussing disposition of a 
decedent’s remains under American law); Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent 
and Child for Succession Purposes, 34 AM. COLL. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 171 (2008) (discussing 
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doctrinal incoherence, as where courts legitimately strive to effectuate a 
particular decedent’s intent but do so through tortured analysis or 
nonuniform latitude regarding its definition, timing, purpose, and proof. 
Ironically, intent—the very subjective component that can override 
rules—is itself rendered vulnerable to its own override, operating like a 
blank screen upon which others can project themselves as actors or those 
acted upon, innocently coloring their view of the testator’s desires or 
more intentionally shading its signals in desired ways.  Such distortion 
would be minimized were the doctrine of testamentary intent better 
developed in substance and in proof. 
b. Societal Goals 
Accepting an individual’s will into probate actualizes that 
individual’s testamentary intent, a desirable outcome standing alone.  
Aggregated, however, doing so also animates the core value of 
testamentary freedom, doctrinal respect for which legitimates the policies 
of autonomy, self-definition and actualization, and self-determination 
that law serves. 
i. Testamentary Freedom in General 
Testamentary freedom is volition—whether to write a will at all, and 
if so, over what items, in what amounts, and to whom.231  Like the 
property over which it is exercised, it captures the ability, or property 
right, to make a voluntary, free, deathtime transfer, which meshes well 
within basic ownership doctrine as well as its donative and contractual 
freedom analogs.  Moreover, testamentary freedom involves more than 
simply transfer.  Exercising a transfer right to beneficiaries, itself a form 
of use and enjoyment, simultaneously exercises the right to exclude, 
                                                                                                                       
the definition of parent and child in intestacy statutes); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of 
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1094–96 (1999) 
(discussing traditional succession law and the effect on the nontraditional family).  See generally 
RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004) (comprehensively 
capturing the literature and discussing the realities of modern family in relation to inheritance law). 
 231. For assorted reasons ranging between intention, ignorance, avoidance, and oversight, most 
decedents will not exercise testamentary freedom, instead defaulting to a state’s legislative 
determination of how property should devolve.  See, e.g., Astrachan, supra note 224, at 45 (noting 
that in 1977 in New York it was likely that up to 50% of decedents left no will).  To the extent that 
the state scheme reflects the wishes of most people, most of the time, intestate death is not a total 
abandonment of personal preferences or utilitarian outcomes, at least for those whose wishes, if 
known, would fit within majoritarian norms. 
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preventing acquisition by would-be heirs through intestacy or the state 
through escheat.  It is also highly prized.  Courts have described 
testamentary freedom as among “the most sacred rights attached to 
property”232 and “ancient and precious[,] . . . running from the dawn of 
civilization in an unbroken line down to the present day.”233  Breathless 
as they are, such words would not be used were they entirely untrue. 
Testamentary freedom is a statutory creature, unquestionably 
regulated234 and arguably existing solely by legislative grace.  Under the 
now-familiar maxim, “the dead hand rules succession only by 
sufferance.”235  Requiring that testamentary intent be expressed through a 
certain channel and in a certain way limits the freedom accorded the 
right, but is undoubtedly permissible in the same way that property in 
general can be limited by rules of substance and form.  But the Supreme 
Court appreciates its functional constitutionalization by characterizing 
testamentary freedom as “an extraordinarily valuable right over which 
restraint must be carefully exercised”236 and an integral part of Anglo-
American jurisprudence since feudalism, with abridgement deserving 
heedful scrutiny.237 
ii. Protecting Testamentary Freedom 
Formalities limit testamentary freedom by restricting expressive 
form.  The same can be said of the doctrines of testamentary capacity or 
undue influence, which can invalidate wills otherwise compliantly 
                                                     
 232. In re Estate of Foss, 202 A.2d 554, 558 (Me. 1964) (citing Deering v. Adams, 37 Me. 264, 
269 (1853)). 
 233. Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Ky. 1967).  See generally 
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at 10–11 (“[T]he universal law of almost every nation (which is a 
kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying person a power of continuing his 
property, by disposing of his possessions [either] by will [or by statute] . . . .”). 
 234. Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 214 (1997).  No property right is absolute; all bend 
to countervailing concerns when government regulates or even acquires them.  Within the 
testamentary-freedom context, limits issue on both procedural, e.g., the formalities themselves, and 
substantive levels.  For example, testamentary freedom over all property is limited by age and 
capacity requirements and public policy concerns; testamentary freedom over some property is 
limited by mortmain legislation, legitime, and elective share statutes or survivorship rights.  See 
generally id. at 214–16 (discussing general testamentary principles). 
 235. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). 
 236. Guzman, supra note 226, at 636 (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715–16 (1987)). 
 237. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715–16 (citing United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627–28 
(1896)). 
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expressed.238  But each of these doctrines has as much to do with 
protection as limitation.  Dismissing the expression of testamentary 
intent by precluding its formation by a testator lacking baseline mental 
ability theoretically protects decedents from themselves, and finding 
undue influence—or its variant, fraud239—determines that the intent as 
expressed was not really that of the testator at all.240  Whether either 
doctrine serves its intended goals, both position against the probate of a 
seemingly valid will in ways that, like an intent–formalities coalition, 
prove law’s commitment to safeguarding the integrity of volitional will-
making processes and results, and, therefore, to testamentary freedom. 
In part, there lies the tension.  Law is willing to engage in 
occasionally freewheeling exercises, through open evidentiary channels, 
to find that a particular testator either could not or did not mean what she 
said.  In short, law backs into the protection of testamentary freedom, 
even against highly formal, attested documents, through will-contest 
doctrine.  Why not engage these questions directly through more 
meaningful, direct attention?  If testamentary freedom is precious and 
sacred241 and if its abridgement deserves heedful scrutiny,242 so too do 
the millions of individualized intents that together give it life.  After all, 
the concept of testamentary freedom is just that—a mere concept—
unless it is effectuated through individuals’ intent. 
B. Reworking Testamentary Intent 
Ad hoc acceptance of individual instruments into probate where the 
facts are hard and certain outcomes are sorely desired—by the decedent, 
the factfinders, or both—does not alleviate doctrinal problems.  In fact, it 
creates as many difficulties as it solves.  Appeals would not be 
uncommon for documents that seem non-testamentary on their face, and 
whether at trial or on appeal, judicially stretching extant doctrine to cover 
testamentary intent essentially ignores precedent and undermines respect 
for the law.  Moreover, litigation again increases as indeterminate  
 
                                                     
 238. See Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in the Elderly: A 
Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 71, 71 (2004). 
 239. Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 51 
VILL. L. REV. 25, 53 (2006). 
 240. See Marson et al., supra note 238, at 78–80 (describing undue influence in will execution). 
 241. See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 714–15. 
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outcomes encourage otherwise wary or resistant litigants to recalibrate 
their prospects and roll the dice. 
Coupling high-value ends with inexpensive means to secure them is 
powerful, especially when positioned against low-value but expensive 
formalistic impediments to their attainment.  That identifying 
testamentary intent can be “hard” or “easy” within an individualized 
judicial response is no longer sufficient.  A more comprehensive strategy 
combining substantive and procedural avenues is called for, capable of 
removing unnecessary impediments to intent determination without 
sacrificing the protections that requiring it affords. 
The suggestions that follow could be taken together or separately.  
Revisiting the cases earlier discussed through testamentary intent as 
reformed reveals that overlap often exists.  Moreover, while the effect of 
the suggestions as applied is intrinsically affected by the governing 
jurisdiction’s approach to documentary compliance, their thrust is 
directed toward the judicial concept of testamentary intent itself rather 
than legislative formulae for when it is met. 
1. Structural Reform 
As currently stated, testamentary intent is tightly hemmed, 
demanding that its holder intend a deathtime disposition of property 
through the specific document proffered.  This definition should be 
broadened in two ways.  First, neither the will nor the animus testandi 
impelling it should demand positive disposition of property at death and, 
instead, should simply reflect intent-governing probate distribution of an 
estate.  This focal shift recognizes testamentary significance where, for 
example, a document does nothing more than identify an executor, 
disinherit an heir, or revoke an earlier will.  Further, it also appropriately 
shields testamentary intent from that found within a will substitute.  This 
change links with a second structural suggestion, which eliminates the 
requirement that the decedent have intended the precise document 
proffered to be “The Will.”  It should instead suffice that the decedent 
intended testamentary significance as expressed through the document 
rather than actually effectuated by it.  If contracts can be formed without 
intending “a contract”243 and if trusts can be created without calling them 
by name,244 so too should courts seek to effectuate a testamentary legal 
                                                     
 243. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text. 
 244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 cmt. a (2003). 
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result, documentarily expressed, irrespective of its maker’s view of the 
title to afford it or its instrumental effect. 
The conventional formulation is not without merit.  Tying a testator’s 
deathtime dispositive intent through a precise instrument then at hand 
and now presented for probate increases seriousness in its execution and 
enhances its later evidentiary value.  Such one-to-one mutual 
reinforcement of a will in both its “desire” and documentary senses 
limits trickery or mistaken over-inclusion, particularly where the 
document itself must meet some formality threshold.245  True, completely 
severing intent and specific documentation could inspire chaos, with 
words or conduct “transcribed then interpreted” after death into some 
recognizable form heavily affected by the hand of its transcriber.  
Nevertheless, existing agitation between intent and formalities already 
demonstrates that some ties are simply more tight than faithfulness to 
testamentary freedom should invite.  Moreover, such criticism overstates 
the issue.  As with formalities generally, it is unnecessary to pose 
antipodal extremes by presenting the choice as between an intent itself 
intended to be accomplished by one particular instrument and intent tied 
to nothing at all.246 
The cost of retaining unnecessary, intent-defeating levels of inquiry 
with the potential to work great mischief on application outweighs the 
residual value in the current requirement.  The definitional reformation 
here suggested adopts an intermediate position requiring some 
document-bridging intent and action, leaving the remaining questions as 
merely those of type. 
                                                     
 245. Under the existing intent requirement of operational significance given to the particular 
instrument propounded, an often determinative component seems to arise where the casual 
instrument suggests that its recipient save it.  See, e.g., Estate of Blake v. Benza, 587 P.2d 271, 272 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that after postscript stating that letter recipient “‘can have my entire 
estate[,]’” writer admonished recipient to “‘SAVE THIS’”); In re Estate of Kimmel, 123 A. 405, 405 
(Pa. 1924) (“‘[L]ock [this letter] up [because] it may help you out.’”).  See generally C.S. Parnell, 
Annotation, Letter as a Will or Codicil, 40 A.L.R.2d 698 (1955) (noting potential importance of 
words indicating writer’s desire to keep document secret or retain it as proof).  Nevertheless, the 
writer of a letter not containing such a fortuitous admonition may well feel the same way and either 
believe that no additional statement is necessary or fail to consider the issue at all. 
 246. See, e.g., John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 73, 80 (2008) (critiquing formalities relaxation in part by suggesting that taken 
to its extreme, the trend would eventually result in simply trusting judges to discern what a particular 
decedent would have wanted). 
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a. Tying Testamentary Intent to a Rule-Compliant Document 
A modest possibility would counterbalance the loosened definition 
of testamentary intent with the requirement that the expressive document 
meet all execution requirements, themselves corroborating the writer’s 
considered deliberation.  This approach would probably not effect 
appreciable change and, in some instances, might even reverse the clock.  
For attested documents, it is unlikely that attached testamentary intent 
would be in question anyway.247  And as well as essentially devolving 
into a much-maligned formalism—although hustled in through intent 
rather than formality rules—statutory perfection is not even the majority 
approach given broad adoption of legislative and judicial corrective.  
Even where strict compliance still reigns, either for all wills or only 
holographic ones, it may be more stated than real with courts covertly 
excusing noncompliance by an interpretive light hand. 
One avenue through which this approach may actually alter judicial 
outcomes, however, concerns the holographic will.248  The treatises are 
replete with instances where even an entirely handwritten, dated, and 
signed document complying with the strictest of jurisdictional rules is 
nevertheless denied probate for lack of testamentary intent.249  For 
example, in In re Moore’s Estate, six days before committing suicide, the 
decedent signed and dated a letter that read, “Here is my ring.  I leave 
you this and all that is mine. . . .  Dont [sic] grieve for me.  I love you.  
I’ll leave a Will.”250  The court refused to accept the document into 
probate, stating that it “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] . . . negatives any 
idea that she considered the letter . . . to be a Will[, and o]n the 
contrary . . . shows that some other writing yet to be made would be her 
Will.”251  While the court was probably correct in its conviction, the 
decedent, if asked, presumably would have stated that she intended the 
specific testamentary result nevertheless.  This should be sufficient.  
Were the definition of testamentary intent altered to require a showing of 
                                                     
 247. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.  Aside from its presumptive intent-reflective 
terms discussed, circumstantial evidence of the document’s safekeeping, such as being left with an 
attorney, filed with a court, or kept with other important papers, would likely suggest that its writer 
perceived it as a will through the traditional formulation of testamentary intent. 
 248. See, e.g., In re Estate of Serbousek, 751 N.W.2d 718, 719 (S.D. 2008) (reiterating its two-
step approach taken in assessing a purported holograph: statutory compliance and testamentary 
intent). 
 249. See, e.g., 1 PAGE, supra note 20, § 5.14 (collecting cases). 
 250. 228 P.2d 66, 66–67 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). 
 251. Id. at 68. 
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a compliant document’s intended rather than operational effect, many 
more decedents would die with their wishes fulfilled. 
This issue of present versus future will-making intent often arises 
where an individual requests that an attorney draft an initial will or 
change an existing one.252  Many jurisdictions follow the line of 
reasoning stated above to note that such a request is not, by definition, 
intended by the decedent to constitute her will.253  Again, the result may 
be overly harsh, particularly where the time between the request and the 
decedent’s death is short.  Compare contract law’s treatment of letters of 
intent as, in certain cases, contracts themselves.254  Irrespective of the 
outcome reached in any particular case, revising the definition of 
testamentary intent may at least encourage more meaningful 
consideration of the intent question rather than glib invocation of an 
intent-defiant rule.  Indeed, if courts are willing to disregard relatively 
clear manifestations of conditional intent as merely indicating the 
impetus for writing a will rather than the precise condition upon which it 
was to operate, perhaps they should consider the reverse possibility that 
instruction letters do indeed represent testamentary intent and, as with all 
wills, are conditional upon the testator’s not having a later change of 
mind or of heart. 
b. Tying Testamentary Intent to the Casual Document 
Whether the relaxed version of testamentary intent can be found in 
casual documents is more troublesome.  First, there is legitimate 
distinction between documents clearly attempted as wills but falling 
short of the rules and those not clearly attempted as wills whether rule-
compliant or not.  Again, the jurisdiction’s means–ends take on 
compliance rules and intent effectuation will largely answer the 
question.255  This Article does not expressly advocate for excusing rules 
                                                     
 252. See, e.g., In re Henry’s Estate, 248 N.W. 853, 854 (Mich. 1933). 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 854–55 (signed and witnessed letter directing attorney’s modification of 
existing will denying probate to); In re Will of Smith, 528 A.2d 918, 918–19 (N.J. 1987) (refusing 
probate of holographically compliant letter delivered to attorney stating “[m]y entire estate is to be 
left jointly to [my stepchildren]” as reflecting intended basis of will rather than will itself); In re 
Estate of Schiwetz, 102 S.W.3d 355, 362–64 (Tex. App. 2003) (declaring ineffective written 
instructions to attorney to make changes to existing will). 
 254. See, e.g., Thomas C. Homburger & James R. Schueller, Letters of Intent—A Trap for the 
Unwary, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509, 513–18 (2002) (discussing three possible views of the 
letter of intent as (1) a binding and enforceable contract; (2) a contract to negotiate in good faith 
rather than consummate the contract; or (3) a term sheet creating no obligation at all). 
 255. See generally Brown, supra note 39, at 102–07 (addressing competing approaches to 
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in favor of intent.  But a “lack of testamentary intent” should not itself 
operate as an obdurate gatekeeper when it more than likely exists.  That a 
non-compliant or even casual document might reflect it is not startling at 
all and, moreover, is what substantial-compliance and dispensation 
approaches already achieve when excusing rule compliance in a 
document’s admission.256 
Casual documentary expression is roughly divisible into immediate 
and deferred communicative acts.  Immediate communicative acts exist 
where speakers publish messages to an audience.  Within wills law, the 
most common versions evoked are instruction letters to attorneys, 
“promise” letters sent to those affected or benefitted by their terms, and 
third-party letters discussing prior or contemporaneous testamentary 
intent.  Deferred communicative acts might include promise letters never 
sent; posthumously found letters addressed “to whom this may concern”; 
and unpublished diary entries or their equivalent.  Unfortunately, many 
such forms fail under traditional intent structures—a person that sends a 
letter to his attorney requesting a modification to a will cannot have 
intended the letter itself to be a will.  But this sort of reactionary rejection 
of testamentary intent should give way to a real consideration of whether 
the instrument nevertheless reflects testamentary significance before 
turning to the rule-compliance question.  Each communicative form 
described above should be at least capable—especially where signed—of 
yielding testamentary intent as redefined irrespective of whether it also 
meets formal rules or is ultimately accepted into probate. 
c. Justifying Loosened Intent 
Broadening testamentary intent continues to makes sense when 
considered from the perspective of protecting testamentary freedom.  
                                                                                                                       
discerning testamentary intent in an ostensibly testamentary instrument). 
 256. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 146 (1998) (“Although a 
document . . . was not executed in compliance with Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated 
as if it had . . . if [its] proponent . . . establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent 
intended the document or writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . .”).  Progressive as it 
generally is, here the Uniform Probate Code seems to have placed itself in a remarkably inconsistent 
position.  Section 2-503 permits testamentary intent, implicitly defined as evidence that the decedent 
intended the document to constitute her will, to rescue a fully defective document.  Id.  By its own 
terms, however, it does not apply to compliant ones, presumably leaving the adopting jurisdiction’s 
own definitions in place.  Id. 
Commentary to section 2-503 nevertheless stresses the inverse relationship between 
documentary noncompliance and the likelihood of proving testamentary intent through clear and 
convincing evidence.  Id. § 2-503 cmt., 8 U.L.A. at 147. 
GUZMAN FINAL 1/4/2012  8:08 AM 
366 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
Documentary formalities and capacity rules are mainly justified by the 
protective functions they perform for the individual testator rather than 
her relatives or “the system.”257  If so, it is hard to see how refusing to 
grant testamentary significance to even casual documents that reflect it—
especially handwritten and signed ones in a jurisdiction that recognizes 
holographic wills—is fair.  Consider a simple example: A writes a letter 
to B, stating “when I’m gone, all is yours.”  If A later executes a valid 
will, then the relevant inquiry becomes whether any ostensible will that 
preceded it was thereby revoked in whole or in part.  A’s testamentary 
freedom remains protected irrespective of the presence or absence of 
testamentary intent accompanying the original letter.  If A does not later 
execute a valid will, however, A’s heirs lose if the court accepts the letter 
as one; B loses if the court does not.  When B loses, so does A, and 
testamentary freedom fades.  Where courts straitjacket the intent 
doctrine, it is questionable whether A is actually being protected, whether 
A needs or deserves it, and whether there are superior ways to provide it. 
Gift law is clearly solicitous of donors over donees by requiring 
delivery258 or refusing to recast a failed gift as a self-declared trust.259  
The rules sensibly encourage the existence of donative intent and compel 
its solid proof, which is particularly important where a donor lives on to 
regret the act.  That transactions do not happen with oneself illuminates 
the seemingly inexplicable distinction with which law treats sellers.  For 
example, by accepting the sufficiency of “the proverbial peppercorn, [or 
even] ‘a horse or a canary [. . . if that is what] the promisee chose,’”260 
the law presumes that sellers need no protection beyond such basics as 
unconscionability or fraud, while interposing great formalism to protect 
the donor, and often from herself.  Professor Jane Baron adroitly explains 
that the legal assumption that predominates about gifts is that donors are 
“fundamentally unreliable and deceitful,” whereas bargainers in business 
are trusting, trustworthy, and reliable.261 
                                                     
 257. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 34, at 491–97. 
 258. See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 872 (N.Y. 1986). 
 259. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 16(2) (2003) (stating that intent to make an inter 
vivos gift unaccompanied by delivery will not be effectuated as a self-declared trust). 
 260. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Couldery v. Bartrum, (1881) 19 Ch. 394, 399). 
 261. Baron, supra note 41, at 157.  Professor James Lindgren extends the point, observing 
slightly differently cast pejoration: 
In the law of wills, the story told about people is that their seriously intended 
statements about their property can’t be trusted.  They are so weak, old, feeble, and 
subject to pressure that they need extraordinary protection from themselves.  Their 
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Some distinction lies in the fact that contract scenarios always 
implicate one party’s intent, understanding, conduct, and reliance to 
check the other’s, whereas in the testate context, the lone relevant intent 
is the testator’s.  But that seems to counsel even more to effectuating that 
one intent, even if somewhat imperfectly expressed, rather than treating 
each A of the world as a fool, liar, or worse.  If A was a fool, that she is 
now dead inures her from personally experiencing any ill effects of an 
unwise bequest.  True, direct evidence of A’s intent is no longer 
available.  But that not every criminal, tortfeasor, or contract breacher 
directly admits culpability has not deterred courts from rendering 
outcomes with far more serious liberty and property consequences than a 
determination that a now-decedent originally meant what she said.  By 
refusing to probate casual documents, it is as though courts are 
dispensing more punishment than protection.  And the “winners” will 
often be the heirs—conveniently, those whom the legislature has deemed 
worthy from the start. 
Consider instead that in writing the letter, A was a liar, or at least 
prone to dissembling.  Attempted wills should effectuate freedom rather 
than recrimination.  But if any “punishment” is to be had, it should set 
against one who communicates some testamentary intent to begin with 
by holding her to her word.  If, as with contracts and some torts, law is 
willing to assign consequences where subjective intent does not exist, its 
refusal to do so where it manifestly does is puzzling.  It is jarring, for 
example, to hold one who accidentally crosses another’s land liable for 
trespass damages, yet utterly discount the salutary effects of a relatively 
clear writing through a peculiarly hard-bitten definition of testamentary 
intent.  Admittedly, broadened judicial recognition of testamentary intent 
within casual documents could make writing them a risky enterprise, 
sending them even more so.262  But risk, like punishment, deters; 
deterrence, if rational, encourages.  While the “casual testator” herself 
                                                                                                                       
spoken words are completely worthless.  Their written statements are without meaning 
unless they’re witnessed by two people. . . . And so on. 
In the law of contracts, . . . the story is completely different.  People are intelligent and 
competent.  They know their own mind.  Other people can rely on their seriously made 
statements.  They don’t need protection from themselves.  Their spoken words are 
enough to convey millions of dollars.  And their written statements have meaning without 
witnesses. 
Lindgren, Formalism, supra note 9, at 1009 (footnotes omitted). 
 262. The notion is not new.  See, e.g., McBride v. McBride, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 476 (1875) (“The 
mischief of converting private letters into wills—of clothing loose and unguarded expressions with 
the solemnities of testamentary acts—is too obvious to require comment or discussion.”). 
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will be neither directly deterred nor capable of recidivism anyway, the 
overall legal signal sent could further enhanced deliberation and 
documents with cleaner expression or disavowal of testamentary intent.  
Given the tendency of rising and older generations alike toward text, e-
mail, or web-based correspondence, exploring intent within casual 
documents would be prudent now, before the likely onslaught of 
attempts to effectuate electronic documents and signatures begins. 
Particular decedents may actually need and deserve protection from 
the consequences of their own acts, such as being pressured into leaving 
a document that benefits another.  The documents that result should not 
be sifted out of probate by facilely applying strict intent-definitional 
rules.  Instead, where facts warrant and relevant evidentiary standards 
were met, the doctrines of fraud, duress, coercion, testamentary capacity, 
and undue influence should suffice to backstop egregious results in 
particular estates.  Recognizing their utility in such a safe-keeping role 
would be nothing new.  For example, these doctrines are already invoked 
as providing sufficient safeguard when assessing whether a document 
substantially complies with the wills act or the effect of an interested 
witness on the validity of a will.263 
Admittedly, wills law, including that of formalities and intent, is not 
solely about testator protection.  First, it is also designed to shelter 
heirs.264  As incessantly repeated, however, an expectancy—the label 
assigned to an heir’s expectant share or a will beneficiary’s anticipated 
bequest—is not property.265  Thus, extinguishing it in an heir apparent by 
finding testamentary intent through more expansive interpretation would 
do nothing more than the law already allows.  While the same could 
initially apply to putative beneficiaries under casual documents, a 
difference exists.  For heirs, the expectancy arises in default of exercised 
testamentary freedom.  For beneficiaries, it is affirmatively created—
“expected”—by its exercise and, therefore, should hold the dominant 
position.  And beyond the protections that will contests already afford, 
spouses are likely ensured an elective share against a testate estate.  If 
law’s obsession with avoiding will over-inclusion reflects bias toward 
the protection of heirs over owners and beneficiaries, one wonders why 
                                                     
 263. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.160 (West 2009) (beneficiary-witnessed will is 
not invalid, nor is beneficiary’s interest necessarily purged, but a rebuttable presumption of duress, 
menace, fraud, or undue influence is created). 
 264. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 215 (discussing use of purging statutes to 
protect non-witness heirs). 
 265. See Guzman, supra note 189, at 786. 
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no jurisdiction save one266 has seen fit to extend similar guarantees to 
children.  Reductio ad absurdum, perhaps individualized testamentary 
freedom is not as revered as the courts would have us think.  Perhaps law 
should either let courts decide what a particular decedent should have 
wanted or allow legislative bodies to do the same through mandatory 
intestacy rules. 
Second, wills law is also understandably concerned with maximizing 
the efficient use of judicial resources.267  Nevertheless, by contributing to 
the very qualitative mess that has engendered so much litigation to begin 
with, perhaps these branches should bear some of its corrective costs, 
erring, if at all, on the side of documentary inclusion pending judicious 
resolution of testamentary doctrine.  Courts perform hard tasks all the 
time.  That is their job.  Moreover, as neither protection of heirs nor of 
systems has reached the near-constitutional level that testamentary 
freedom enjoys, rigorous search for individualized testamentary intent 
should prevail over the desire to manage any strain it might occasion. 
2. Procedural Reform 
A jurisdiction’s willingness to excise the substantive requirements 
that a will both dispose of property and reflect the decedent’s intent that 
the document itself should do it would diffuse some of the following 
concerns.  Nevertheless, three stand-alone procedural moves, some of 
which already exist in specific jurisdictions, could improve the quality of 
testamentary-intent determination even if they end up taking far more 
time. 
First, and irrespective of instrumental ambiguity, where a document 
is proffered as a will, a court should consider all evidence relevant to its 
maker’s testamentary intent—whether documentary, oral, or 
circumstantial—and leave basic evidentiary rules to cover questions of 
relevance and the extent to which prejudicial harm outweighs probative 
value.  So enhancing admissibility would decrease wasteful, peripheral 
litigation over the ambiguity of the document and the actual scope of 
applicable rules.  Moreover, by affecting cost–value calculations for 
litigation, accepting that the contested document will not be the final 
                                                     
 266. By constitutional and statutory authority, Louisiana is the only state with a limited forced 
heirship provision for descendants of a certain age, mental, or physical capacity.  See LA. CONST. art. 
12, § 5. 
 267. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 8, at 167 (discussing majority rule that, absent 
probable cause for a contest, enforces no-contest clauses to prevent unmeritorious litigation). 
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“say” on the matter could even abate an initial filing or subsequent 
appeal.  Extending evidentiary sources beyond the document itself would 
cure existing anomalies.  If testamentary intent is so important that its 
presence can override a defective will or its absence vitiate a compliant 
one, it should be important enough to permit a search for its existence 
beyond a paper’s four corners. 
Second, as is already true for attested wills, a court should presume 
that the testator acted with testamentary intent for any document offered 
for probate—attested or holographic—that meets all of the jurisdiction’s 
statutory requirements for a valid will.268  The burden of disproving 
testamentary intent would then rest upon challengers,269 again through a 
broad admissibility standard, by the traditional preponderance of the 
evidence for casual documents and clear and convincing evidence for 
duly attested ones.270  Finders of fact would remain free to make 
credibility assessments over witness testimony.  This reform would align 
with existing presumptions over will revocation.  While revocation, by 
reverting to a prior will or allowing the property to fall into intestacy, 
arguably effects substantive results at the same level as will execution, 
it—along with the intent that it requires—is presumed whenever a 
document known to have been in the testator’s possession at death 
cannot be found thereafter.271  Courts willing to presume revocation 
through non-documentary negative implication should be equally, if not 
more amenable, to presume testamentary intent on signed documents 
regular on their face. 
                                                     
 268. Note the traditional difference between a formally attested will—which permits a court to 
be “‘reasonably certain’” that it was seriously intended—with a holograph, which leaves that 
question “‘open to doubt.’”  Estate of Brown, 218 Cal. Rptr. 108, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting 
Gail Boreman Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in California, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 
605, 632 (1981)). 
 269. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 270. This shift in the standard is defensible given the high probability of testamentary intent in 
duly attested wills regular on their face and the quasi-fraudulent behavior of putative testators 
executing wills for some collateral purpose other than disposition at death.  See supra notes 19–20 
and accompanying text.  Perhaps evidence more convincing than that an alleged testator was just 
joking, bluffing, or confused would demonstrate that she did not realize that she was signing a will.  
Such facts would probably involve fraud, an independent basis upon which to challenge a will, 
which ironically would suffer no extrinsic evidentiary bar in proving it because “‘fraud vitiates 
everything.’”  Grigg v. Hanna, 278 N.W. 125, 132 (Mich. 1938).  Thus, cases such as In re Estate of 
Duemeland arise where immediately after pronouncing that “[o]nce it is shown that the will was 
properly executed, ‘the executed will is the decedent’s testamentary intent,’” the court pivoted to 
reminding that “[r]egarding testamentary intent . . . extrinsic evidence is not admissible except to 
show fraud or mistake.”  528 N.W.2d 369, 371 (N.D. 1995) (quoting In re Estate of Ostby, 479 
N.W.2d 866, 871 (N.D. 1992)), 
 271. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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Third, where the document does not meet all jurisdictional rules but 
the substantial-compliance or harmless-error doctrines could possibly 
accept it into probate, then the burden of establishing testamentary intent 
should rest with its proponent.  This is the current position espoused by 
both the Uniform Probate Code272 and the Restatement (Third) of 
Property.273  Both sources, however, require that the proponent establish 
intent through clear and convincing evidence.274  Admitting the difficulty 
of determining a decedent’s intent, this standard nevertheless seems 
overly burdensome and should be replaced with the same preponderance 
rule as asserted for formality-compliant documents.275 
3. Reforms Applied 
Working both substantive and procedural ends might initially seem 
unduly expansive, but reprocessing the cases described earlier through 
such reform reveals that doing so not only improves particular outcomes, 
but indeed may merely legitimate that which is already covertly, and 
often inappropriately, done. 
Dexter Johnson’s handwritten and signed document leaving his 
brother a pittance at the close of a more detailed—but still invalid—
typed document could have been deemed a valid holograph, thereby 
incorporating by reference the typed words of the paper on which it 
appeared.276  By so holding, the court would have upheld his 
testamentary intent directly and avoided the embarrassing contortion and 
mischievous result of essentially defining a will as any document with a 
testamentary flavor simply to permit its later “republication.”277  Under 
this rule, Oral Fountain, who executed a handwritten and witnessed 
                                                     
 272. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 146 (1998). 
 273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999). 
 274. Id.; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503, 8 U.L.A. at 146. 
 275. See generally Sherwin, supra note 38, at 460–62.  Professor Sherwin cogently explains that 
failing to recognize testamentary intent is as bad as its identification where none exists—it is a 
disappointment exacerbated by imposing a clear-and-convincing requirement upon its proof.  Id.  
Indeed, I would assert that failing to find it is, on balance, worse.  See Lindgren, Formalism, supra 
note 9, at 1020 (noting that the problem of rejecting documents where testamentary intent seems 
clear “is not solved by the dispensing power, because . . . [it] is based on a high standard for 
testamentary intent, clear and convincing evidence,” that “[t]o solve this problem, we need a lower 
standard of proof or more sensible judging,” and that “[u]nder the new [Uniform Probate Code], 
we’ll have to hope for the latter”). 
 276. Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928, 929–32 (Okla. 1954) (per curiam); see supra Part 
III.C.1. 
 277. See Johnson, 279 P.2d at 931–32. 
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document captioned “Last Will and Testament” connecting specific 
property to each of her children’s names,278 and who later informed her 
sister that she indeed had a will,279 would have died with her 
testamentary intent intact even though the writing she executed did not 
specifically use words of disposition.280  Charles Kuralt’s letter to his 
paramour, clearly expressing his intent to provide for her at his death, 
could have been probated immediately rather than forced into expensive 
substantive and procedural litigation that may have ultimately 
accomplished Kuralt’s wishes, but through avoidable doctrinal 
distortion.281 
By applying all of these reforms, costs could have been saved, serial 
litigation avoided, and outcomes enhanced.  Moreover, irrespective of 
whether one agrees with, or even approves of, either an individual’s 
conduct or her testamentary desire, that desire is what matters most if 
intent doctrine is to remain cognizant of the individualized desires that it 
serves. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Testamentary freedom and testamentary intent are twinned.  As long 
as testamentary freedom remains a valued societal goal—and nothing 
suggests that it will not—effecting testamentary intent is crucial as the 
only means through which to secure it.  Paradoxically, however, the 
enhanced position that testamentary intent has achieved—both directly at 
operational levels and indirectly through relaxed foreseeability and 
privity rules for estate planning malpractice, more thoughtful 
testamentary-capacity and undue-influence analysis regarding atypical 
estate plans, increased recognition, and even creation, of assorted will 
substitutes, and the very fall of formalism itself—has not been matched 
by concomitant rededication to understanding its twisted contours. 
Inertia could explain this failure, especially if the task is perceived as 
either too hard or, more palatably, unnecessary given a perceived low 
incidence and level of trouble caused, faith in individual courts to reach 
appropriate ad hoc results, or the belief that other correctives have gone 
                                                     
 278. Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 428 (Ark. 2004); see supra Part III.C.2. 
 279. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d at 429. 
 280. Cf. id. at 432.  The document would have been presumed to have been executed with 
testamentary intent irrespective of its failure to reflect disposition on its face.  Moreover, extrinsic 
evidence would have been admissible to establish such intent. 
 281. In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000); see supra Part III.C.3. 
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far enough.  The notion that the perfect may be the enemy of the good 
does not mean that the good cannot be made better. 
Part of the problem is unavoidable so long as wills create nothing in 
terms of experienced or actual realignment of rights.  If testators feel no 
“wrench of delivery” in executing them, then they will be more casual 
about their creation.  If beneficiaries feel indifferent to their creation, 
then they will be less insistent on formalization.  Were the expectancy 
elevated to some point higher than its current legal purgatory, perhaps all 
parties involved would internalize the costs and benefits of will-making, 
then form intents and adjust signaling behaviors accordingly.  That is 
unlikely in the short term, if ever. 
An incomplete solution would simply be greater coherence at 
legislative, judicial, and theoretical levels over what testamentary intent 
is, how it must be expressed, what will suffice to establish it, and how it 
can be proved.  But clarity alone is too timid a step.282  A more 
comprehensive strategy—one targeting readjustment of intent boundaries 
and increased pressure on its determinative capabilities—would better 
serve all the goals that wills are thought to express.  The resurgence of 
academic literature asserting the need for enhanced sophistication in 
intestacy rules should suggest that default settings, particularly where 
they involve individual rights of extraordinary personal and societal 
magnitude, should not be too proud to give way to outcomes that respect 
intent. 
More forgiving intent doctrine might be hard and might drive 
transition costs in the short term; capturing intent is never easy.  But that 
is what courts are supposed to do.  As the trial court judge somewhat 
paradoxically remarked during the trial over Charles Kuralt’s will, 
“We’re in a search for the truth, and we’re going to pursue it with 
dispatch if it takes all summer.”283  His words reveal that efficiency and 
justice can both be pursued.  Long views appreciate where justice breaks 
down.  They recognize the providence of time. 
                                                     
 282. As Professor Myres McDougal lamented when writing about the torment of property 
complexities, “To make a superb inventory of Augean stables is not to cleanse them.”  Myres S. 
McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
1077, 1115 (1942) (reviewing RESTATEMENT OF PROP. (1940)). 
 283. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 774 (Mont. 1999) (quoting the district court below). 
